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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Energy Law, the 
International Hellenic University.  
 
   This thesis derives its academic inspiration from the intriguing interplay 
between Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties( intra-EU BITs) and the EU Law, 
generating many fascinating implications. The European Commission’s 
Decision on June 2015, to initiating infringement proceedings against five 
Member States, requesting them to terminate intra-EU bilateral investment 
treaties between them, has stirred the heated debate with regards the position 
of intra-EU BITs with the EU legal order 
 
   In my dissertation, I decided to deal with some of the fundamental academic 
questions arising in this context. The multidimensional juxtaposition of interests 
where the undebatable need for investment protection under a BIT scheme 
clashes with fundamental aspects of the acquis communautaire as well as the 
status of EU Law and the extent of its intervention in the area of Intra EU BITs, 
will, as inherent features of this interplay, be extensively examined in this thesis. 
Furthermore, the issue of compliance with intra-EU arbitral awards through the 
prism of EU State Aid rules, as well as the future of the energy Charter Treaty 
will be also analyzed.  
 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to my academic 
supervisor Pr. Friedrich Rosenfeld, who generously provided significant help 
and guidance to complete this thesis. 
I am also particularly thankful to the academic staff of the International Hellenic 
University for a year full of unforgettable experiences. 
Finally, I would like to thank a person who prefers not to be mentioned, but who 
has been my rock and my inspiration, throughout this period of my life. 
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CHAPTER 1.   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    The very character of foreign investment, as one of the necessary “ingredients” for 
achieving economic wealth, prosperity and welfare in a liberalized economy, 
constitutes also the fundamental rationale and the “driving force” behind the 
establishment of a robust regulatory and, more importantly, protective framework, to 
surround Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). As the synonym for significant economic 
growth and development through valuable injections of essential financial resources, 
technological advancement, amelioration of practices and infrastructure, and 
enhancement of competitiveness, are some of the most “cherished gifts” that FDI 
“brings” to the recipient states. The benefits are reciprocal; in this sense, the capital-
exporting country also derives significant advantages from the stimulation and 
promotion of foreign Investments, particularly via the internationalization of local 
businesses and their penetration in new markets which strengthens their external 
impetus and competitiveness worldwide. In addition, outward FDI contributes 
significantly also to the economic development of the capital-exporting state particularly 
through the repatriation of profits generated from foreign activity as well as through the 
creation of a dynamic and efficient exports sector.  
    The “genesis” of the international investment law has manifestly injected a 
considerable impetus to the to the “global” aspiration, to establish a concrete and 
stable legal but also economic environment for FDI, capable to “insulate” cross-border 
investments from political risks and relative “threats” to which foreign investors are 
usually subjected as entering the “terra-incognita”, namely the territory of the host-
State. While investment efficiency considerations continue to remain the key 
determinants driving FDI as an economic activity, investment decisions nowadays are 
constantly even more influenced, also by the ability of the host-State to provide for an 
amalgam of safeguards and guarantees, expanding far from the traditional economic-
centric momentum they used to have. Particularly, an easily accessible, well-regulated, 
stable, secure climate and generally an investor-friendly institutional regime, efficiently 
surrounding and complementing an economically attractive environment, constitutes a 
significant tool for stimulating FDI and maximizing the benefits such activity entails. In 
this sense, a legally certain, credible and comprehensive framework of protection is the 
condition sine qua non for the attraction and encouragement of cross-border 
investments.    
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     Despite its obvious and uncontestable importance for the development and the 
enhancement of international economic relations and the significant impetus they 
“inject” in the economic environment of the host-State, cross-border investment, suffers 
from regulatory fragmentation. Any attempts, although inspired, to subject international 
investments to an encompassing multilateral legal framework, seem to have failed1. At 
the nucleus of this continuing fragmentation stands the gross divergence of interests 
between the involved players in this risky and expensive “game” called FDI, that cannot 
be easily reconciled to eventually allow the adoption of a supranational, truly 
internationalized framework, comprehensive but also flexible enough to effectively 
regulate FDI in a universal manner.  
      Albeit the absence of a multilateral instrument on the protection and promotion of 
cross-border investments, the field of FDI could be nevertheless seen as being 
regulated by a dense “patchwork” of various types of agreements. Central position in 
this “mosaic” of regulatory instruments, hold the Bilateral Investment Treaties for the 
promotion, protection and, in some cases, liberalization of cross-border investments2.  
     Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have always been regarded as ultimate 
“facilitators” of international investment and the ‘keys” to “unlock” economic growth and 
the. Their general purpose is to safeguard investments made in the territory of the 
Contracting States via the provision of an extensive platform of substantive and 
procedural rights to the investor’s disposal. The most typical substantive standards of 
protection provided under a BIT, are guarantees of National (NT) and of Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) treatment but as well of appropriate compensation in the event of 
expropriation, commitments on the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and of full 
protection and security of the investment, undertakings on the observance by the State 
of the investor’s legitimate expectations, State promises to abstain from the adoption of 
discriminatory measures, and several kinds of assurances on capital movements and 
payments. However, the most central and unique feature encompassed in the 
protective framework of a  BITs, is the attribution to the investor of a direct right to bring 
claims on an alleged breach of his substantive rights by the State,  in front of an 
alternative, binding, and sector-specific adjudicatory forum, the investor-State 
Arbitration 
     Also in the EU area, the investment protection landscape is overwhelmed by such 
BITs demonstrating an extra- but also an intra–EU dimension. In fact, the conclusion of 
                                                 
1
 See in this respect, the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) negotiated in the framework of 
OECD between 1995 and 1998. 
2
 Eilmansberger T., Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 46 COMMON MKTL.REV383 (2009), 
p.384. 
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such legal instruments, between EU Member States inter se and vis-à-vis third State, 
could be well characterized as prolific. The numbers speak on their own: According to 
the features provided by the Commission, around 200 intra-EU BITs and 1200 extra-
EU BITs exist within the EU legal order3. The proportions are that interesting also 
regarding the cases of investment disputes submitted to arbitration under intra-EU 
BITs. The numbers correspond to the 70 per cent and 20 per cent of the International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) case load4.  
    Concentrating further on the intra-EU BITs, the majority of them have been 
concluded as a Pre-Extra-EU BITs between “old” EU Member States and States that 
had not yet acceded to the EU at the time of the conclusion. As a result of the EU 
enlargements, these agreements were “inherited” within the EU legal order and 
transformed to intra-EU BITs.  
     
A. THE ANATOMY OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM 
 
     Characterized as an “anomaly within the EU internal market”5, intra-EU BITs and 
their status, especially after the last EU enlargements but also under the post-Lisbon 
competence-balances in the area of EU Common Commercial Policy, have become 
the “bone of contention” between the EU Commission and those Member States 
wishing to leave their intra-EU BITs untouched by the Commission’s “fire”.  
   On June 2015, the European Commission decided to initiate infringement 
proceedings against five Member States, namely Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, 
Slovakia and Sweden, requesting them to terminate their intra-EU BITs6. According to 
the Commissions perspective: “these BITs are out of date inside a single market of 28 
countries…In particular, intra-EU BITs fragment the single market by conferring rights 
to some EU investors on a bilateral basis. Their provisions overlap and conflict with EU 
single market law on cross-border investments… The problem with BITs is not 
theoretical and has very practical consequences. For instance, one recent arbitration 
proceeding based on an intra-EU BIT has produced an outcome that the Commission 
                                                 
3
 See, EU Commission Staff Working Document on Capital Movements and Investments in the EU: 
Commission Services’ paper on Market Monitoring, SWD (2012) 6 final, 13. 
4
 See, Yotova R., The new EU competence in foreign direct investment and intra-EU investment treaties: 
Does the emperor have new clothes?, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Freya 
Baetens ed. (2013), p.388. 
5
 See EU Commission’s Submissions to the Eureko arbitral Tribunal, July 2010, Eureko v Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension,  26 October 2010, 177 at 
<http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EurekovSlovakRepublicAwardon Jurisdiction.pdf> 
6
 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5198_en.htm. 
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considers incompatible with EU law, as the arbitral award constitutes illegal state aid7. 
This situation may create legal uncertainty for cross-border investors, - at a time when 
the EU's top priority is to promote an environment that encourages investment”. 
    This statement seems to encapsulate all the major EU concerns around the 
continuing validity and applicability of intra-EU BITs that seem to have been elaborated 
into a completely autonomous investment protective system, operating in parallel with 
the EU provisions on investment protection. But is this “co-habitation” really 
problematic? 
      Seen from an different ankle, given the textual but also contextual structure of the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provisions on the freedom of 
establishment and freedom of capital flows, it could indeed be validly argued that TFEU 
is in fact dealing with cross-border investment between EU Member States. However, it 
is doing that in an obiter, rather incidental than systematic, concentrated and targeted 
manner, merely as one of the numerous other commercial sectors that could fall under 
such a vague and open-ended regulatory scope of the internal market provisions. 
Hence, a question arises, on whether the EU framework on internal market and the 
fundamental EU freedoms as the bedrocks upon which the envisagement of a fully 
liberalized market was effectuated, suffice in effectiveness and comprehension so as to 
subrogate intra-EU BITs and constitute henceforth the only applicable framework of 
protection when it comes to intra-EU FDI. The answer to this question, affirmative or 
negative, entails significant implications, especially with regards to the intra-EU 
investors and their legitimate expectation towards a stable and secured legal 
framework to surround and safeguard their investment. 
     Admittedly, an attempt to engage in a thorough examination of the intra-EU BITs 
phenomenon within the context of and in interrelation with EU Law, and to address 
whether it really threatens to erode the solid foundations of the integrated EU CCP 
framework, is deemed to fall if isolated from clarifying their status within the landscape 
of intra-EU investment protection, the purposes underlying their operation as well as 
the nature and the necessity of the substantive standards of protection they contain.  
All these intrinsing issues will be analyzed in this thesis, which will furthermore examine 
two of the most practically important aspects of the interplay between intra-EU BITs 
and EU Law, namely the interaction of inter se IIA’s and intra-EU arbitral awards with 
the EU State Aid rules and the future of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) as a 
multilateral IIA demonstrating, inter alia, also an intra-EU dimension.  
                                                 
7
 The Commission quotes here the Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food S.A, S.C. Starmill 
S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. (Micula) v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, available at: 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/697#sthash.IEElewOt.dpuf 
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B.  THE EASTERN SUGAR   v.  CZECH REPUBLIC ARBITRATION CASE  
 
        Once upon a time, specifically on March 27, 2007 an arbitral tribunal, constituted 
under the auspices of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 
issued a partial award in the matter of an ad hoc arbitration between Eastern Sugar B. 
V. (Netherlands) v. Czech Republic based on a BIT between Netherlands and the 
Czech Republic (Eastern Sugar). And although this little “storytelling” might seem as 
the beginning of another interesting arbitration “fairytale”, this is not the case with 
Eastern Sugar. This case, the first that engaged in a principled discussion of the 
interplay between intra-EU BITs and the EU Law, has opened the Pandora’s box 
regarding the “survival” of intra-EU BITs as norm of international investment law, within 
the EU legal order.  
     According to the Respondents position, if those treaties survived after the Czech 
Republic’s accession to the EU instead of being terminated (as Czech Republic 
suggested), this might distort the EU law principle of equality of treatment. Similarly, a 
simultaneous application of the BIT and the intra-EU investment regime would breach 
the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, and the principle of 
mutual trust8. With regards to the arbitration clause incorporated in concerned BIT, 
Czech Republic submitted that with regards to issues relating to EU Law, the ECJ’s 
exclusive jurisdiction leaves no room for international arbitration in this area. Finally, 
the tribunal, upheld the validity and applicability of the intra-EU BIT (including the 
arbitration clause contained therein) from the prism of international but also of EU Law. 
And somewhere between international and EU Law considerations, this interesting 
“journey” towards eventually “drawing the picture” of the conceptual and practical 
interplay between intra-EU BITs and the EU Law, begins… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Burgstaller M., European  Law and Investment Treaties, 26(2) J.INT.L ARB. 181 (2009), p.184. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU INVESTMENT LAW LIYING AT THE HEART OF A 
POLICY SHIFT: DOES LISBON DIRECTLY AFFECT THE STATUS OF INTRA-EU 
BITS? 
 
    The advent of the Treaty of the Lisbon in 2009, an institutional reformer and a policy 
transformer that substantially redefined the scope of Common Commercial Policy 
(CCP) framework, effectuated significant alterations particularly in the land scape of EU 
investment policy area. EU has literally waken up in a significantly differentiated scene, 
where the balance of powers between the institutional center of EU and its periphery, 
i.e. the Member States, was revisited to eventually to lead to a significant transition in 
the allocation of competences.  
   Under the former regime, EU enjoyed not exclusive but shared competence in the 
area of international investment. Notable practices exemplifying the exercise of powers 
in the cross-border investment field in a shared “modus” are, on the one hand the 
prolific conclusion of BIT between EU Member States and third countries, some of 
which accessed the EU under the recent EU enlargements (a fact that essentially 
entailed the transformation of these pre-extra-EU BITs to intra-EU BITs and, as such, 
into the bone of contention between the Commission and concerned Member States),  
and the development of the 2006 Minimum Platform on Investment for EU Free Trade 
Agreements (MPol) by the EU on the other hand, as an outline of basic standards 
regulating market access and the potential basis for the realization of the EU 
envisagement to create a fully-fledged, should policy to surround FDI.  
     Under the post-Lisbon regime and by virtue of Article 207 TFEU, EU is empowered 
with exclusive external competence in the field of international investment, as FDI is 
incorporated into the EU CCP framework9. This substantial extension of competences 
includes also the exclusive competence of the EU to negotiate and conclude inter- 
national investment agreements with third (non-EU) countries such as bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 and thus, pursuant to Article 3 TFEU, falls under the exclusive regulatory competence of the EU. 
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A. DOES EU EXCLUSIVE FDI COMPETENCE ENCOMPASSE ALSO INTRA EU 
INVESTMENT ACTIVITY, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 207 TFEU? 
 
 Article 207 TFEU constitutes the provision that explicit confers a new exclusive 
competence to the EU to regulate FDI10. However, although it locates FDI under the 
umbrella of the CCP, emits to define the notion’s conceptual scope. Hence, the 
objective dimensions of the new EU competence seem rather opaque since no clear 
delimitations are provided to elucidate the precise width of those new powers.  
    The absence of a clear definition and the breath of specific clarifications on what 
exactly falls under the scope of FDI could be relevant also in the context of intra-EU 
BITs. In the Eastern Sugar case, the Commission, via a letter of the DG Internal Market 
quoted by the tribunal, seemed to consider intra-EU investment a matter falling under 
its exclusive competence by denying intra-EU BITs applicability on relating matters:     
“For facts occurring after accession, the BIT is not applicable in    
matter falling under the Community competence. Only residual 
matters, such as diplomatic representation, expropriation and 
eventually investment promotion would appear to remain in 
question.11”    
    This stance of the Commission generates a number of questions. If the EU exclusive 
competences under the post Lisbon CCP regime encompass also intra EU BITs, could 
this competence shift hold the answer to eventually resolve the legal conundrum of 
intra-EU validity and applicability? Could the Commission’s argument that under the 
post Lisbon status quo in the division of powers within EU, issues relating to 
international investment are considered subjects falling under its exclusive 
competence12, in fact affect the life expectancy of intra-EU BITs as they stand? An 
answer to these question of competences could elucidate the real dimensions of the 
EU Law and intra-EU BITs interplay and in particular, whether there is a real conflict of 
norms of whether this conceived collusion is a mere interpretative one.  
                                                 
10
 Indeed, Article 207(1) of the TFEU states explicitly that CCP includes trade in goods, in services, in 
trade-related aspects of intellectual property and in FDI. Also, Article 206 of the TFEU highlights that ‘the 
Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on FDI’. 
11
 EC Letter of 13 January 2006, quoted in  the Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic, para119. 
12
 In the same lines the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Towards a 
comprehensive European Investment Policy, 7.7 2010, COM (2010) 343 final (Commission 
Communication on Investment) and the Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment 
agreements between Member States and third countries, on the new Article 207TFEU. 
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    First of all, the letter of Lisbon Treaty and further, the text of Article 207 TFEU remain 
silent on the issue and do not locate intra EU FDI under its normative scope. Could 
anyone validly argue the opposite?  
    It flows from a systematic interpretation, that the inclusion of Articles 206 and 207 
TFEU in the Chapter 5 of the TFEU, which deals exclusively with the Union’s external 
actions, indicates that the EU legislator intended to restrict the provisions application to 
external affairs. This argument is enhanced also by the fact that CCP framework, under 
which FDI is located, constitutes part of the Union’s action on the international scene 
and of the main pillars of the European Union’s relations with the rest of the world. 
Therefore, from that point of view, its regulatory width seems to not extend to intra-EU 
FDI but merely surrounds investment relations vis-a-vis third countries.          
    Further, an attempt to locate intra-EU BITs under the normative umbrella of CCP 
exclusive competence of the EU by contesting that in the absence of clear delimitations 
rations materiae, intra-EU FDI could be construed as an implied power of the EU, 
seems an over-stretching approach. 
    Moreover, according to Article 207 TFEU, the introduction of those new rules on the 
allocation of competences in the area of CCP does not otherwise affect “the 
delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States”; thus it does 
not interrupt the existing balance of competences between the EU and Member States 
for example in areas of shared powers such as the internal market regulation, in which 
the allocation of competences as remains undisturbed. From the EU perspective, and 
according to the Commission’s interpretative communications in the area of intra-EU 
investment, intra-EU FDI and, consequently, intra-EU BITs, constitute issues of internal 
affairs. As such, they fall basically under the regulatory space of Articles 49 and 63 
TFEU incorporating the fundamental freedoms of establishment and of capital flow 
respectively. These provisions, the conceptual nucleus of internal market, essentially 
constitute the only relevant -if not the only available stricto sensu- source of primary 
law  and the most -at least potentially- comparable provisions to those of BITs, to be 
found within the legislative corpus of EU Law. In this context, intra-EU FDI is conceived 
as forming, rations materiae, a part, another piece in the “jigsaw” of the internal market, 
which constitutes an area of shared competences between the EU and its periphery, 
the Member States.    
     In principle, and according to Article 2 TFEU, which stipulates the rules of vertical 
allocation of competences within the EU, the ability of Member States to exercise their 
regulatory powers in an area of shared competence is inextricably linked to and 
depending upon the extent to which the EU has already and exhaustively exercised its 
powers in the respective field. In the area of intra-EU FDI, the EU has not attempted to 
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regulate, by adopting any legislative acts such as secondary legislation or international 
agreements but only with non-binding instruments such as notes and 
communications13.  
    In this context, of particular significance is the fact that, while the EU legislator 
considered it necessary to explicitly regulate extra-EU FDI14, he has omitted to 
somehow clarify also the status of intra-EU FDI even when presented with an optimal 
negotiation opportunity in the context of the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. In 
another crucial circumstance, i.e. the conclusion of accession agreements by the EU 
with “new” Member States, the EU legislator again remained silent on the issue of intra-
EU FDI and particularly on the status of intra-EU BITs.  
    In  the absence of any concrete EU attempt to exercise its shared competence in the 
field of Internal Market and specifically and regulate and safeguard in a comprehensive 
and effective manner analogous to that through which intra-EU BITs encourage and 
protect FDI, it can be concluded that the member states have legitimately adopt legally 
binding treaties such as the intra-EU BITs in the field of intra-EU FDI in exercising of 
their shared competence with the EU, to the extent that this does not contravene the 
fundamental Treaty freedoms.  
 
B. CONCUDING REMARKS 
 
   The substantial extension of competences under the post Lisbon regime was born 
out of the wish to develop a concrete and robust framework to surround the EU 
investment policy. Moreover, it clearly reflects the constantly increasing ambition of the 
EU to enhance its role and effectively involve in the elaboration of international 
investment law norms within and without its territory. 
     Possibly, this policy shift could provide also an effective solution to this “quiz” 
regarding the status of intra-EU BITs, which have for long constituted the legal 
bedrocks of inward EU investment protection system. Instead, intra-EU BITs are not 
encompassed within the normative framework of article 207, thus they remain a matter 
of shared competence. As such, they were validly concluded and at least from an EU 
perspective, remain effective until their termination according to the respective rules on 
termination of international treaties. The event of accession of one of the signatories 
States in the EU, except from the following transformation of those BITs from extra to 
                                                 
13
 Yotova R., The new EU competence in foreign direct investment and intra-EU investment treaties: Does 
the emperor have new clothes?, in INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Freya Baetens 
ed. (2013), pp. 392-398. 
14
 See supra, note 13. 
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intra-EU agreements, a merely technical differentiation to their “profile” as international 
investment norms, does not entail any other direct substantive implications with 
regards to their legal status, validity and applicability. This is because accession to the 
EU as a legal act, does not suffices per se and ipso facto to trigger their automatic 
termination, suspension or supersession by the EU Law since such consequence in not 
envisaged neither in the TFEU or the Accession Agreements, nor in the concerned 
BITs. 
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CHAPTER 3.  
 
 INTRA-EU BITS AND THE EU LAW: THE EU PERSPECTIVE 
 
     The perceived collision between those two competing legal systems, the intra-EU 
BITs and the EU Law as an autonomous legal order, does not occur in a legal vacuum 
but rather in an environment where EU Law is particularly relevant. The following 
chapter addresses the status of intra-EU BITs through the prism of some EU 
considerations concentrating on the EU Law primacy and its reflective effects on the 
continuing validity and applicability of pre-accession international agreements, as the 
intra-EUBITs are. 
 
A.           ARTICLE’S 351 TFEU RELEVANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTRA-EU 
BITS  
 
    From an EU perspective, Article 351 TFEU constitutes perhaps the only provision 
within the corpus of EU Law that could potentially clarify the status of the intra-EU BITs 
and resolve the legal conundrum of their applicability as norms of international 
investment law, “inherited” into the EU legal order by virtue of the respective Member 
States accession to the EU15. 
    The article, enshrining the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, explicitly affirms the 
obligation of Member States to respect and fulfil their international obligations 
constituted before the entry into force of the TFEU or, in case of acceding States, 
before the date of their accession. It clearly intends to the suspension of the principle of 
EU Law primacy and to the prioritization of any prior concluded international 
agreements. The ultimate rational underpinning Article 351TFEU is to grandfather such 
agreements, as creatures of international law, and to safeguard their validity and 
applicability, however not unconditionally, but to the extent that their preservation as 
legal norms does not clash with the integrity and unity of the EU legal order . In this 
context, a material incompatibility or contradiction with the EU law and its cornerstone 
principles could bring such agreements under the dissecting “Communal microscope” 
and activate Article 351(2) TFEU.  
     Under Article 351(2) TFEU, the doctrine of primacy of the EU law is reactivated to 
serve this time as conflict of law rule and “orient” this compatibility assessment. In case 
                                                 
15
 Eilmansberger T., Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 46 COMMON MKTL.REV383 (2009), p. 
421.  
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where the pertinent international legal norm is found in a material or even teleological 
collision with the EU Law, Article 351(2) TFEU introduces an amendment obligation, 
namely requesting the prompt elimination of any divergences found in the scope of 
such international agreements that directly and irreconcilably threaten EU Law’s 
consistency and its uniform application. Even in such case, though subject to the 
necessary adjustments, these agreements remain valid and effective.   
     In the Eastern Sugar and the Eureko16 case the Commission suggested the 
inapplicability, in the intra-EU BITs context, of the Article 351 TFEU, the ultimate 
guardian of the validity and priority of any international agreements within the EU Legal 
order. According to EU jurisprudence, and under a rather restrictive interpretation, 
Article 351TFEU is conceived as affording protection only to anterior international 
agreements concluded between an EU Member State and a third State. Specifically, in 
the Commission v Italy case, the Commission stated that “in matters governed by the 
EEC Treaty, that Treaty takes precedence over agreements concluded between 
Member States before its entry into force, including agreements made within the 
framework of the GATT17”.  
      According to this line of strictly grammatical and rather systolic interpretation, the 
Article’s application in the context of anterior intra-EU international agreements seems 
to be excluded because, Member States are considered to have, by deference to the 
EU Law’s primacy as the supreme rule law within the EU legal order, voluntarily 
relinquished at the occasion of their accession to the EU, any substantive rights 
deriving from international agreements concluded in an intra-EU modus, i.e. between 
EU Member States18. 
    However, even, if the letter of Article 351 leaves no space for expanding its 
applicability also in anterior inter se international agreements, under the following 
perspective, the doctrine of EU Law, seems to nevertheless penetrate within the area 
of pre-accession intra-EU agreements under the same methodological constellation 
followed by the 351(2)TFEU. Principally, EU does not preclude Member States from 
concluding inter se international agreements particularly in fields not or partially 
covered by EU Law, however not unconditionally, but rather on the premise that they 
are compatible with the EU Law. 
    Hence, international agreements are superseded by EU Law not automatically, in an 
unreserved, unqualified and thus, unorthodox manner provided for the doctrines 
                                                 
16
 Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and 
Suspension (Perm. Ct. Arb., Oct. 26, 2010).  
17
 Judgement in the European Economic Commission v The Italian Republic, 10/61, EU:C:1962:2. 
18
 Eilmansberger T., Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law, 46 COMMON MKTL.REV383 (2009), p. 
422. 
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generally accepted character as a conflict of laws rule, but rather, only where conflict 
arises vis-à-vis  provisions of primary or secondary EU Law19. It would be an over-
simplistic approach and an arbitrary generalization to assume a priori precedence of 
the EU Law over pre-accession agreements between Member States only by virtue of 
the event of accession to the EU, in an absolute manner, without any further 
qualification with regards to their compatibility with the EU Law.  In the same line 
Soderlund who argues that intra-EU international agreements will not automatically be 
affected by the mere operation of the act of accession; instead it will be the obligation 
of the acceding state, as stipulated in the pertinent association agreement, to actively 
take appropriate steps to remove incompatibilities which may exist between the terms 
of the international treaty and the dictates of EC law20.  
    Hence, the “compatibility” test is also central in the intra-EU international agreements 
area.  Under the broad Burgoa constellation, incompatibility shall be assessed based 
on whether the agreement at stake constitutes an obstacle in the effective application 
of the EU Law and generally the attainment of the Union’s objectives21. The same 
parameter shall also apply to intra-EU international agreements, because where 
incompatibility is absent, to assume an a priori inapplicability of an international 
agreement, especially in the context of intra-EU BITs, is an over-inclusive approach 
that imposes an disproportionate burden upon the beneficiaries, now unreasonably 
deprived of substantive rights they previously enjoyed. The conceptual test of 
“incompatibility with the EU” enshrined in Article 351(2), is therefore, also relevant and 
shall be deemed applicable by analogy also in the context of inter se international 
agreements as the only criterion that could legitimately lead to the elimination or the 
imposition of any limitations on the validity and applicability of an diverging inter se 
regime, by virtue of EU supremacy doctrine.   
 
 
B.         THE EU LAW PRIMACY ARGUMENT 
  
    At the nucleus of the alleged conflict of norms between the intra-EU BITs regime and 
the EU Law, as the central EU argument that essentially concentrates the substance of 
this legal problematique surrounding the survival or the eventual extinction of these 
                                                 
19
 Dimopoulos A., The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements  Between EU 
Member States Under EU and International Law, 48 COMMONMKTL.R EV 63 (2011). 
20
 Soderlund C., Intra-EU BIT  Investment Protection and the EC Treaty, 24(5) J.INTL.ARB 455(2007). 
21
 Case 812/79, Judgment of the Court of 14 October 1980, Attorney General v Juan C. Burgoa. 
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interesting legal animals, the intra-EU BITs, lies the argument of the primacy of the EU 
Law.  
    The establishment of the doctrine of primacy or supremacy of the EU Law, as a 
product of the ECJ’s jurisprudence, could be illustrated as one of the landmark points 
of European integration. In the Costa v ENEL case, the ECJ enunciated the principal 
as a maturation of its Van Gen den Loos judgement on the EU Law’s direct effect and a 
clearest manifestation of its implications. The doctrine conceptualizes and 
institutionalizes the prevalence accorded to the EU Law vis-à-vis conflicting national 
law norms. Further, it reflects and emphasizes the prioritized status of the EU Law 
within the EU legal order as the overriding rule of Law consolidating those overarching  
“europeanized” values and objectives within the EU legal order that shall supersede  
those of purely domestic but also international origin. 
      The doctrine of supremacy of the EU Law was invoked by the Commission in the 
Eastern Sugar  and in the Eureko cases (in the forms of a letter of the DG Internal 
Market and as part of the Commissions Observations respectively), as truly 
encapsulating the EU perspective towards the status of the intra-EU BITs. Particularly, 
and according to the Commission, the doctrine of primacy of the EU Law, conceived 
and understood also as a “made in the EU” conflict of law rule penetrates also in the 
area of international agreements concluded prior to accession of the concerned 
Member States, and entails the inapplicability of the those BIT, where in collision with 
the primary and secondary EU Law.  The Commission enhanced its argument on the 
precedence of EU Law over the BIT provisions by its submission in the Eureko case 
stating: 
         “As a result of the primacy of the EU law vis-à-vis pre-
accession treaties between     Member States, conflicts between 
BIT provisions and EU law cannot be resolved by interpreting and 
applying the relevant EU law provisions in the light of the BIT. Only 
the reverse approach is possible, namely interpretation of the BIT 
norms in the light of EU law.22”  
     Under this EU perspective, EU Law is conceived by the Commission as the “key” 
that will eventually “unlock” or to “double-lock” the applicability of the intra-EU BITs. In 
a hierarchically structured, multileveled legal order, as the EU legal order is, and in 
circumstances of pluralism of legal norms, the EU Law, by virtue of its primacy, is 
understood as the superior legal norm that prevails over and supersedes conflicting 
national and even international legal structures, and as the ultimate adjudicator of the 
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 Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and 
Suspension (Perm. Ct. Arb., Oct. 26, 2010).  
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status of the intra-EU BITs, the arbiter to decide on their applicability. In this respect, it 
states in its amicus curiae brief in the Eureko case that “ in the EU legal order…neither 
the BIT as such nor the conflicting provisions become “invalid”; but they cannot be 
applied where they conflict with EU law23”. It follows, that from an EU perspective and 
by virtue of the primacy doctrine as a conflict of law rule, the intra-EU BITs per se or 
their relevant provisions may lose their applicability only when they clash with the EU 
Law structure24.  
    Therefore, following the structure of this syllogism and accepting the doctrine of 
primacy as a conflict of law rule, one must firstly decide on whether there is an 
incompatibility between the concerned anterior Treaty and the EU Law, because then 
and only then the doctrine of EU Law primacy as a conflict rule has a reason to be 
activated. In this context, the relevance (in the intra-EU BITs area) of Article 351(2) 
TFEU constellation, inserting the indispensable criterion of “incompatibility with the EU 
Law” as the premise upon which the hierarchical subordination of anterior international 
agreements may only be permitted, shall be revisited. 
 
 
C.     THE SCENARIA OF INAPPLICABILITY AND TERMINATION OF AN  
INTRA-EU BIT PURSUANT TO THE INCOMPATIBILITY TEST  AND THE 
HYPOTHETICAL INCOMPATIBILITY CONSTELLATION    
    
     Where an incompatibility between an inter se international agreement and EU Law 
emerges, compliance with the doctrine of EU Law primacy requests the adoption of all 
the necessary measures by the Member State to ensure the elimination of the 
incompatibility. Under this relatively flexible structure, it can be inferred that as a matter 
of principle, the existence of an incompatibility does not per se produce any legal 
imperative to phase out the applicability of a prior concluded international agreement, 
especially where the incompatibility is considered curable e.g. through expansion of the 
IIA’s scope of protection ratione personae. Inapplicability, or even denunciation of an 
incompatible IIA shall be confined to cases where the existence of the incompatibility 
constitutes a substantial and irremediable threat to the EU legal order and leads to a 
profound and “incurable” conflict of norms.  
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 Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and 
Suspension (Perm. Ct. Arb., Oct. 26, 2010).  
24
 Soderlund approaches the same conclusion although from the reversed starting point : “And, as there is 
no conflict between the substantive provisions of existing intra-EU BITs and the EC Treaty, the primacy 
of EC law is a moot point to start with.” 
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       Hence, recourse to the termination of an IIA scenario, even accepted as possible 
by the ECJ25, should be considered as an ultima ratio, a solution of last resort, to be 
used exceptionally and in extreme cases, namely where the contradiction and the 
collision with the EU Law is so grave, that their survival would profoundly undermine 
the spirit of EU provisions and where any alternatives including renegotiation or 
suspension of such agreements are deemed insufficient to resolve the emerged conflict 
of norms. 
     This approach founds itself in compliance with the overarching EU objective of 
international law observance and the ultimate preservation of pre-accession 
international treaties. Since these agreements were concluded outside the EU 
environment and under no obligation to observe the EU structures and 
uncompromising conceptual “red lines”, some divergences and fragmentation must be 
at least expected. It shall be noted that the purpose of the” incompatibility test” is not to 
be used as a legal weapon to “extinguish” every single agreement concluded prior 
accession or competence shift. This would lead to the “disarmament” of Member States 
regulatory powers particularly in areas of shared competences and eventually lead to 
an EU regulatory monopoly. Such approach would breach the principle of subsidiarity 
and the rules in the allocation of competences but also of international doctrines of 
“pacta sunt servanda” and of “state continuity”. After all, if that was the Unions genuine 
intention, the first victims which such a “wipe-off” campaign would have targeted, would 
be no other but the bilateral tax treaties between Member States which, instead, 
continue until now their peaceful  life within the context -and under the auspices- of 
internal market, the beating heart of the aquis communautaire and EU integration.  
       In line with the above consideration, the development and application in the ECJ 
cases by the ECJ of the hypothetical incompatibility test is conceived as a very 
dangerous conceptual tool in the ECJ’s assessment toolbox to legally purify the 
transformation of the “incompatibility test” from a balancing constellation to the ultimate 
“annihilator” of all prior accession international agreements26.  
      While the general obligation to eliminate conflicts deriving from the interplay 
between pre-accession agreements and EU Law, on the altar of preserving the integrity 
and autonomy of the EU legal order and guaranteeing its uniform and effective 
application, seem acceptable, to stretch out this duty so far as to encompass potential 
conflicts that have not yet even materialized seems as an approach that completely 
disregards the purposive foundations of the compatibility criterion, i.e. to balance the 
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interplay between the EU Law supremacy doctrine on the one hand  and the duty to 
preserve the status of anterior international agreements on the other . 
      It is evident, that the ECJ’s recourse to such an extreme methodological tool is 
inextricably linked with its serious concerns regarding its exclusive competence to 
authoritatively apply and interpret EU Law and the institution of international arbitration 
as an alternative adjudicatory mechanism. Thus, the Court seems strongly motivated to 
continue applying the “hypothetical incompatibility” test to any type of pre-accession 
agreements perceived to cast a threat upon its juridical monopoly, including the intra 
EU-BITs. Illustrative of such intention is the fact that in its amicus curiae brief 
addressed to the Eureko tribunal, the Commission referred to the BITs provisions and 
particularly to arbitration clauses as resulting in “serious potential for discrimination 
between EU investors from different Member States, which is incompatible with EU 
law.27”  
    However, specifically in the context of infringement proceeding against EU Member 
States regarding the termination of intra-EU BITs28, any examination of incompatibilities 
pursuant to the “incompatibility” constellation shall reveal  the substantial contradictions 
between those ex hypothesi conflicting norms – if any- and not to transform a material 
coincidence to an incompatibility serious enough to trigger the BITs termination. This is 
particularly important in the area of investment protection, where the subsequent 
termination of a BIT and the elimination of substantive rights deriving from it, based on 
the simplistic argumentation that one or more of its provision is perceived to illustrate a 
tension to possibly collide with EU Law, imposes a disproportionate burden upon the 
Members States as well private actors involved. After all, there is a long distance that 
conceptually and practically separates legal comparability and substitutability from legal 
incompatibility. 
 
D.         CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     From the above analysis the following conclusions shall be inferred: From an EU 
Law perspective, intra-EU BITs are validly concluded by the Member States. Further, 
merely the accession to the EU or the operation of the EU Law primacy doctrine does 
not automatically entails the termination or otherwise affects intra-EU BIT’s 
applicability. The potential effect of the EU Law and the fundamental principles 
underpinning its structure on the legal status of intra-EU BITs depends on the quality, 
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the intensity and the reconcilability of the demonstrated incompatibility with the Union’s 
law. “Disarmament” of such agreements by way of rendering them inapplicable, but 
also by denunciation, shall be requested in the context of compliance with the EU 
supremacy doctrine only as the ultimate solutions to an otherwise “incurable” conflict of 
norms.  
    But even where the divergences between those regimes are irreconcilable, “the 
effective prevalence of the EU aquis does not entail, at the same time the automatic 
termination of the concerned BITs, or necessarily, the non-application of all their 
provisions. This was confirmed also under the Commission’s letter quoted by the 
Eastern Sugar arbitral tribunal: “Without prejudice to the primacy of Community law, to 
terminate such agreements Member States would have to strictly follow the relevant 
procedure provided for this in regard in the agreements themselves29”.  
   Therefore, under the EU “lenses”, termination of IIA’s is a matter falling outside the 
EU Law ambit. But if not the EU Law, then who will decide on this crucial issue? In this 
context, the Commission’s words may very well be considered to encompass an 
implicit recognition of the relative international law norms as the only appropriate 
instruments empowered to determine the impact of EU Law considerations on the 
status of intra-EU BITs and eventually answer the complex question of their validity and 
applicability. 
     From a practical point of view, a mere allegation of existing incompatibilities or even 
a declaration of EU Law prevalence in the form on non-binding instruments as a 
Commission’s letter, signifies that invocation and application of the intra-EU BIT 
provisions within the EU legal order may be problematic -if not absolutely impossible- 
and nothing more. Even if we accept that the EU Law supremacy is that conflict of laws 
rule “which must be recognized also under international law’30, under which 
constellation of hierarchy of norms would an arbitral tribunal, deriving its jurisdiction 
from an inter se IIA, will be obliged to adopt this exclusively EU normative architecture 
as an overarching and overriding rule, the operation of which automatically entails the 
inapplicability of an international law instrument without any further and binding 
qualification?   
     In this sense, the only EU authority competent to assess in a binding manner and 
pursuant to the relevant EU rules, the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU Law is the 
ECJ and in the absent of a Court’s ruling, intra-EU BITs shall be considered as still 
applicable also from an EU Law perspective. But even in the hypothetical scenario 
where an ECJ;s declaration of intra-EU BITs gross incompatibility with the EU is 
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present, the “bindingness” of such a ruling vis-à-vis an arbitral tribunal operating 
principally under the auspices of international law as a supranational judicial forum, 
constitutionally absolutely detached from EU Law structures and considerations, 
including judicial precedent and even jurisprudence constante, is seriously 
questionable. In this sense, to the extent that the problematique of inter se IIA’s 
incompatibility with the EU Law constitutes by nature and by purpose an issue of EU 
internal affairs, the effect of the EU prevalence over intra-EU BITs i.e. the BITs 
inapplicability from the prism of the Union’s Law, is in substance, a matter for “internal 
consumption”, only relevant within the confines of the EU legal order, as it has been 
also demonstrated by the absolute majority of intra-EU BITs arbitral jurisprudence. 
However, this approach does not undermine at all, the importance of the legal 
characterization of the intra-EU BITs as incompatible or inapplicable under the prism of 
EU Law in the context of intra-EU arbitral awards enforceability within the EU Legal 
order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4.     
 
INTRA-EU BITS STATUS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE ARGUMENT OF 
INTRA-EU BITS TERMINATION PURSUANT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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      Both Intra-EU BITs and EU Law are creatures of law generated in the “laboratories” 
of international law31.Indeed, despite the aspirational words of AG Maduro on the 
establishment of “a municipal legal order of transnational dimensions”32 and the ECJ’s 
characterization of EU Law as “a new legal order of international law”, from a public 
international law perspective, EU Law does not itself creates an autonomous and 
distinct supra-national legal order. Although a highly integrated and structurally 
sophisticated legal order, demonstrating institutional and constitutional features of a 
unique “Europeanized federalism”, EU Law remains a subsystem of public international 
law33. Hence, its interplay and perceived collision with intra-EU BITs as international 
law “animals”, shall be evaluated pursuant to general principles and normative 
constellations of international law34. In this context, the appropriate interpretative tools 
to elucidate the crucial issue of the impact of EU Law on the intra-EU BITs validity and 
applicability, particularly when emerged under an intra-EU BIT dispute, are Articles 59 
or Article 30 of the VCLT, encompassing the fundamental interpretative norms to 
resolve conflicts between international law Treaties3536.  
 
A. THE SCENARIO OF DIRECT TERMINATION 
 
       Where the conclusion of the intra-EU BIT has preceded, as a legal event, the 
accession to the EU of both contracting States, the question arises whether and how 
the accession to the EU affects the validity and applicability of the intra-EU BIT as inter 
se agreement concluded under international law. To answer this question we must 
firstly address the scenario of direct termination of the intra-EU BITs on the occasion of 
a Member State accession to the EU.  
    It appears that Member States have not explicitly express their intention to terminate 
the existing inter se BITs in a formal or informal manner, even when presented with the 
perfect opportunity to do so i.e. at the events of 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements. 
Nowhere in the course of the accession negotiations where, traditionally, issues of 
major incompatibilities between the “merging” legal orders are addressed in order to be 
eliminated in the near future, but also neither in the Accession Treaties of the new 
                                                 
31
 (The Easter Sugar arbitral tribunal referred to the TFEU as a regional multilateral treaty elis 175 foot). 
32
 See supra, note 13. 
33
 BURGSTALL UNI 468 
34
 Se supra, note 13 p. 424, also Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on 
Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension (Perm. Ct. Arb., Oct. 26, 2010).  
35
 eastern 156 p 
36
 VCLT leads the interpretative analysis of this complex legal issue premised on the assumption that both 
of the concerned Member States will be parties to the VCLT. However, even in case when this 
precondition is not fulfilled, i.e. where one of the parties to the BIT has not ratified the VCLT, the 
applicability of its provisions shall, nevertheless, be affirmed to the extent they represent customary 
international law. 
   
  -23- 
Member States reference is made on the thorny issue of intra-EU BITs and their status 
within the new European landscape.  
      
B.      THE SCENARIO OF IMPLICIT TERMINATION 
 
    Since the scenario of direct termination of intra-EU BITs shall be abandoned, it must 
be examined whether intra-EU BITs can be considered as implicitly terminated 
according to the relevant international law rules. This has been argued in the prominent 
Eastern Sugar and Eureko arbitration with regard to the Netherlands- Czech Republic 
and Dutch-Slovak Republic BITs respectively. At the heart of this argument lie the 
implied automatic termination of the concerned intra-EU BITs by virtue of Member 
State’s accession to the EU and the subjection of existing investments previously 
governed by the intra-EU BITs, to the EU Law.  
  
I.  THE APPICABILITY OF ARTICLE 59 VCLT 
   
     Article 59 VCLT constitutes the fundamental provision on Treaty conflicts able to 
penetrate into the core of this legal conundrum on the implicit termination of inter se EU 
BITs and eventually resolve it.  
    Article 59 VCLT incorporates the principle of lex posterior, as an interpretative tool to 
resolve conceived conflicts between prior and subsequently concluded treaties 
between the same parties, provided that a) they cover the same subject matter and b) 
the termination of the earlier treaty either i) reflects the intention of the parties or ii) it is 
considered necessary due to the gross incompatibilities between the two treaties that 
render impossible their simultaneous application.  
    Before examining the substantive requirements of Article 59 VCLT, proper 
interpretation of the provision shall, encompass reference to distinct legal question of 
procedural nature and of fundamental importance To the validity and applicability of the 
intra-EU BITs. Does operation Article 59 VCLT leads to automatic –in procedural 
terms- termination of intra-EU BITs?  
 
a. THE  ARGUMENT OF AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF INTRA-EU BITS  
   
    A common argument invoked by the Respondents also in Eastern Sugar and in 
Eureko cases, relate to the implicit automatic termination of the concerned intra-EU 
BITs pursuant to Article 59 VCLT. However, even if a the textual structure of Article 59 
VCLT (particularly the phrase a Treaty shall be considered as terminated..;) may 
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appear to suggest that, termination of the earlier treaty is automatically triggered when 
the substantive criteria provided therein, such approach disregards the contextual and 
primarily the systematic interpretation of the provision according to which, Article 59 
VCLT, like other grounds for treaty denunciation, remains subject to a specific 
termination process pursuant to the fundamental procedural rule on invalidity, 
termination, withdrawal from or suspension of the operation of a Treaty, enshrined in 
Article 65 VCLT37.  
     In line with the overarching objective to safeguard the validity and ensure the 
preservation of international treaties the procedural prerequisite of former notification 
operates in this context as a “bulwark” against the unilateral and without further 
qualification of substantive or of procedural nature, denouncement of a Treaty38. 
Rather, the implicit termination of an international agreement may be triggered under 
this procedural safeguard which guarantees that the substantive prerequisites for 
essentially “disarming” a treaty, endorsed in Article 59 are indeed  fulfilled. 
      In the context of intra-EU BITs disputes, the EU Commission’s observation in the 
Eastern Sugar case, according to which “to terminate such agreements Member States 
would have to strictly follow the relevant procedure provided for this in regard in the 
agreements themselves”, seems to incorporate a denial of the inter se BITs automatic 
termination scenario and simultaneously, a recognition of the necessity to comply with 
the procedural rules on termination provided by the agreement at stake. Also in the 
Eureko case, the Commission’s statement  that “eventually, all intra-EU BITs will have 
to be terminated” demonstrates that neither the EU institutions endorse the event of  
EU accession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia as capable to trigger the automatic 
termination of their pre-accession intra-EU BITs39.  
     Hence, it shall be concluded that seen through the international law lenses, intra-EU 
BITs are not automatically terminated by virtue of the States accession to the EU. 
Instead, they remain valid and applicable at least until their termination in accordance 
with the relevant termination procedure as prescribed under Article 65 VCLT.  
 
 
b. THE “SAMENESS” REQUIREMENT 
 
                                                 
37
 According to this provision,  a State invoking “…a ground for impeaching the validity of a treaty or terminating it… 
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     Concentrating to an analysis of the substantive prerequisites set forth in Article 59, it 
is evident that termination of the intra-EU BITs could be argued on the basis of the lex 
posterior rule, since as the “posteriority” requirement per se is normally fulfilled 
because all intra-EU BITs have been concluded before accession of at least one of the 
signatories to the EU40. However, the “posteriority” requirement does not operate 
autonomously here, but in conjunction with the subjective “sameness” requirement. 
Thus, the question arising is whether intra-EU BITs and the TFEU relate to the same 
subject? And which are the conceptual limits of the sameness requirement? What is of 
crucial importance to address, is  whether the “sameness” condition refers to an 
identity of subjects in the sense of a strict subjective overlap or an incidental 
coincidence in subject matters suffices to trigger the application of Article 59 TFEU.  
        The notion of subjective “sameness” in the context of international treaties 
subrogation constitutes one of the most obscure issues of international law and it is 
particularly doubtful whether it could serve as a concrete condition for applying a 
conflict rule; As illustratively stated in the Japanese Alcoholic Beverages case, “the 
concept of “likeness” is a relative one that evokes the image of an accordion”. As the 
accordion stretches and squeezes, the “version” and the “volume” of likeness is subject 
to constant shifts of perspective could render same a subject that was previously seen 
as diametrically different.   
       The version of “sameness” Article 59 VCLT looks for is of such nature and intensity 
that could give rise to incompatibilities gross enough as to rendering impossible the 
simultaneous application of both treaties. In the intra-EU BITs context, it is seriously 
questionable whether the application of a BIT and particularly its substantive provisions 
per se, even found to some extend overlapping, would in any event undermine or 
impede the application of internal market provisions. As the tribunal in Eastern Sugar 
found, the fact that two legal regimes might be found comparable or overlapping does 
not necessarily render them incompatible.  
    Therefore, it shall be concluded, that the “similarity” criterion inserted in Article 59 
VCLT does not refer to a mere subjective coincidence or to a lato sensu conception of 
“likeness”. On the other hand, neither a “word by word” approach to assess 
“sameness” of subjects seems in line with the rationales underlying the Article 59VCLT 
constellation. In the Eureko case, the tribunal approached the subjective similarity 
criterion as a concept sharing some common features with the notions of “identity” 
operate in the context of the doctrine of res judicata. In this sense, as it concluded, “the 
later treaty must have more than a minor or incidental overlap with the earlier treaty.”   
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c. DO INTRA –EU BITS AND THE TFEU PROVISIONS RELATE TO THE SAME 
SUBJECT MATTER? 
 
     In the view of the respondent States involved in the Eastern Sugar and Eureko 
arbitrations, the intra-EU BITs and the TFEU share the same objective scope. To 
enhance this argument, the respondents proceeded to a comparative analysis of the 
protective standards incorporated with the inter se IIA’s and those provided under the 
EU framework on investment protection, in order to underline their corresponding 
nature. Under this constellation, cross-border investment admission and protection 
would be ensured principally under Article 63 TFEU on the freedom of capital 
movements and payments. Further, the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard would 
be guaranteed under the prohibition on discrimination enshrined in Article 18 TFEU, 
while protection against expropriation would be provided under the equivalent 
operation of general principles of EU Law.  
    However, this “equivalent devices” constellation was not convincing to the tribunals. 
Admittedly, at the heart of both normative frameworks lie the promotion of cross-border 
investment and the development of a solid and stable legal system to efficiently protect 
foreign investment, as the conditio sine qua non for the attraction of transnational 
investment. However, a more thorough penetration into the teleological foundations of 
those regimes reveals that they were driven from different momenta.  
   The EU investment protection framework, which is structured upon the TFEU 
provisions on the liberalization of the EU market, primarily focuses on the elimination of 
any obstacles that could impede access and ultimately on the creation of a 
supranational economic union. In this sense, it concentrates particularly on the pre-
investment stage, whilst BITs incorporate a broad palette of substantive rights and 
remedies conferred to the investor at the post-investment phase, to be ultimately 
enforced under the auspices of international investor- State arbitration. Certainly, the 
liberalization of capital flow is also present within the context of a BIT, however not as a 
primary goal but as a supplementary, supporting “equipment” for the smooth and 
efficient operation of an investment; its overarching objective remains the provision of a 
high and sophisticated level of protection for investors once the investment has been 
effectuated.  
     Therefore, while there may be some partial overlap between those frameworks, it 
does not suffice to validly assume that they address the same subject matter. Indeed, 
some of the EU market-access guarantees enshrined in the EU Law may offer partially 
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some functional equivalence to the BIT standards e.g. the free transfer provisions may 
be considered as covered to some extent by the principle of free movement of capital 
pursuant to Article 63 TFEU. However, the nature and the width of the rights conferred 
by the BITs to investors substantially differ from those deriving from the TFEU which, 
as a multilateral instrument constructed in a more general, abstract basis exactly in 
order to achieve a wide scope of applicability, seems to provide only for a minimum 
standard of investment protection.   
     From another perspective, reference to the maxim of lex specialis derogat lex 
generalis, one of the methodological cornerstones of legal interpretation and resolution 
of normative conflicts also in the field of international law, may further elucidate the 
functional and conceptual inequivalence between EU Law investment protection 
framework and intra-EU BITs, even from a more general point of view4142. Given the 
structure of the TFEU as an multilateral instrument of extremely broad coverage, a BIT 
could be seen as a lex specialis, a special rule that should take precedence over the 
general framework provided in the TFEU, as a valuable elaboration and 
supplementation on the existing general rules, an effective and accurate addition to its 
normative dynamic, ratione materiae, ratione personae etc. In this sense, those two 
regimes cannot be considered “same” merely because they may both be invokable in 
regard to the same factual situation.  
     The diametrical differences in the nature and the width of their normative scope i.e. 
specialized versus general framework, are presumptive of the long distance separating 
those regimes ratione materiae and ratione personae. Ratione materiae, the, 
corresponding to the respective BIT provisions, internal market rules deal with 
investment protection in a rather peripheral manner, by providing a basic outline of 
protection.  
    More importantly, the EU legal framework does not provide the same or equivalent 
“device” to investor-State arbitration clause typically found in BITs as an alternative -to 
recourse to national courts- adjudicatory “path”. Those clauses equip the investor with 
the powerful and indispensable tool to commence arbitration proceedings against the 
host State before an arbitral tribunal, when confronted by a violation of its rights 
deriving from the BIT. In this regards, BITs create a more comprehensive protective 
structure by furnishing, in comparison with the lex generalis, -here the TFEU 
provisions-, the deeper, more detailed regulation of cross-border investment protection 
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via the introduction of special standards such as the fair and equitable treatment (FET), 
the protection against expropriation etc. Hence, these international investment law 
norms could be seen as constituting a special law, substantively more closely related 
and practically more relevant to the issue that both frameworks seek to regulate. 
Certainly, BITs derogate from the general normative framework in the sense that they 
regulate a particular area with greater clarity and definiteness, concreteness and 
sufficiency, also by filling any lacunae exposed in the normative corpus of the more 
general framework.   
Ratione personae, the intra-EU BITs apply between and govern the relationship of an 
investor from the one contracting State with regards to his activities in the territory of 
the other contracting State and vice versa. In this sense, they constitute a personalized 
bilateral, strictly inter partes arrangement, particularly specialized and thus of limited, 
very specific application ratione personae. On the other hand, the comparable TFEU 
provisions regulate the internal market erga omnes i.e. for all EU physical and legal 
persons.  
 
     To examine in more detail whether the partial overlap between intra-EU BITs and 
the EU Law investment guarantees corresponds to functional and conceptual 
equivalence between the respective standards and guarantees, I will refer to some 
typical BIT features and address their comparability with the EU investment protection 
structures. 
 
 
i. THE  FAIR  AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT (FET)  STANDARD 
 
     The fair and equitable treatment (FET), is considered one of necessary “ingredients” 
of a solid investment protection regime, also incorporated in intra-EU BITs and one of 
the most commonly invoked protective standards in investment disputes. Essentially, 
the doctrine serves as a gap-filler, and an overarching, autonomous clause of 
protection to enclose all possible violation of the investor rights that could not fall under 
the conceptual umbrella of more specific standards of protection such as the prohibition 
of expropriation.  
  The substance of the FET standard is closely related to the principle of bona fides and 
the prohibition of venire contra factum proprium (estoppel). In the Saluka case,  the 
arbitral tribunal proceeded to a concrete summary of the standards content by stating 
that a State’s act could be found as a FET violation when it is manifestly inconsistent, 
non-transparent(i.e. not related to some rational policy) or discriminatory (i.e. based on 
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unjustifiable distinctions).  In the NAFTA case Waste Management v Mexico, the 
tribunal found that a conduct attributable to the State is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust 
and unreasonable, discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sectional or racial 
prejudice, or involves a lack of due process, is considered an infringement of the 
minimum standard of fair and equitable treatment.  
      It derives from the above considerations, that the argument according to which the 
protection afforded by a BIT provision on fair and equitable treatment is entirely and 
effectively absorbed by the equivalent EU Law prohibition on discrimination, as argued 
in the Eureko case, shall not be accepted. Discrimination against an investor could 
serve as a serious indicator of a potential breach of the FET standard, however, not as 
the only one. Admittedly, the conceptual width of the FET guarantee, inherently 
enclosing notions of legal predictability and stability, transparency and observance of 
the investor’s legitimate expectations, exceeds that of the EU prohibition on 
discrimination which merely imposes an obligation on Member States to abstain from 
directly or indirectly discriminate between EU nationals. In this regards, from a textual 
but also contextual point of view, there is not any independent, autonomous principle 
codified in the EU law that specifically forbids treatment that is not “fair and equitable” 
in  a sense equivalent to that achieved by the FET standard.  
     The same applies for the “dominant element” of the FET standard, the notion of 
legitimate expectations. In the Tecmed case, the arbitral tribunal defined the meaning 
of this concept from the following perspective: “The foreign investor expects the host 
State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparent in its 
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and 
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies 
and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply 
with such regulations”. Under the EU Law, the concept of legitimate expectations is 
nowhere found as an autonomous norm of protection. On the contrary, the ECJ seems 
not to endorse the operation of such principle that could eventually restrict the 
regulatory space of public authorities and curtail the discretionary powers of the State 
to implement structural policies, as it has demonstrated in its Alcan judgement43. 
    As the Eureko tribunal found, there is no independent principle, encommpasing the 
concepts of non-discrimination, proportionality, legitimate expectations and of 
procedural fairness, yet established in EU law. Rather, equivalence –if any- could be 
deemed to derive from a bundle of principles, including the principle of non-
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discrimination, which, in their cooperation and interplay could potentially produce an 
effect comparable to that of the FET standard. .  
     However, the operation of each and every of these EU Law principles is not 
detached from the fundamental EU public policy considerations nor unconditioned, as 
the operation of the FET standard is44. Rather, they are subjected not only to the 
derogations provided by the TFEU itself as grounds to justify restrictions on the 
afforded protection, but also to the implicit limitations developed by the ECJ in the 
Casis de Dijon and the Gebhard cases, such as the “rule of reasoning”45. 
        It is therefore assumed that the FET standard operates in a more comprehensive, 
broad and legally certain manner. Illustrative examples that depict how broad and 
stretchable the scope of protection accorded by the FET standard is, are cases where 
measures that could not qualify as direct expropriations were eventually regarded as 
constituting a violation of the BIT rights under the FET standard of protection46.  
 
ii. THE FULL PROTECTION AND SECURITY STANDARD 
     
     The same considerations addressed with regards to the functional and conceptual 
inequivalence of the FET standard with the perceived as corresponding EU provisions, 
apply also in the context of the full protection and security standard, a typical feature of 
BITs, sometimes equated as a concept with or even absorbed by the FET standard47.     
      In the Eureko case, the respondent argued that the standard of full protection and 
security as a BIT constellation is inapplicable as superseded by the EU Law, since the 
freedom of establishment in conjunction with the EU prohibition on discrimination, 
provides the same level of protection accorded by the BIT standard.  The tribunal was 
not convinced from the argument and emphasized the insufficiency of the compared 
EU provisions to guarantee such a comprehensive framework of protection as the full 
protection and security structure ensures. The tribunal particularly focused its analysis 
on the fact that the EU freedom of establishment is basically concentrated, ratione 
temporis, to provide protection from discrimination in the pre-establishment stage while 
the right to full protection and security subsists for as long as the investment remains in 
place, no matter whether or not the treatment complained of is discriminatory. 
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iii. PROTECTION AGAINST EXPROPRIATION 
  
     With regards to protection against direct or indirect expropriation as “the most sever 
for of interference with property”48, EU Law does not provide for any prohibition or 
limitation on the Member States right to expropriate alien property, comparable to those 
incorporated in intra-EU BITs.  
    Article 345 TFEU provides that “this Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in 
Member States governing the system of property ownership”. It follows from the 
wording of the Article 345 TFEU that Member States have not relinquished their 
sovereign right to regulate pursuant to national systems, the area property ownership, 
which eventually is left outside of the TFEU “umbrella”. In this sense, EU Law does not, 
in principio, contain a specific and clear legal framework for the regulation of property 
expropriation. The fact that any State interferences with private property shall be non-
discriminatory and proportionate to the aim that is sought to be achieved, pursuant to 
the overarching EU principles of non- discrimination and proportionality of aim and 
effect, does not seem to “insulate” investors from the direct threat of expropriation. At 
the other side of the spectrum, BIT protection against expropriation is offered in an 
absolute, categorical and unconditional manner. 
      The additional argument that the EU Fundamental Rights Charter49 constitutes a 
“protection device” equivalent to that of BIT framework against expropriation, 
commonly presented by the respondent Member States in intra-EU investment 
disputes, suffers from two fundamental weaknesses; although covering protection of 
property rights, the Charter’s protective guarantees can only be invoked against EU 
measures, i.e. in cases where it is the implementation of the EU Law by EU institution 
and Member States that mandates or triggers the adoption of the measure adversely 
affecting private property50. In this sense, measures of purely national origin (including 
measures regarding property ownership which under Article 345TFEU remain a matter 
regulated on national basis) are left outside the CFR’s protective scope. Furthermore, it 
is seriously doubted whether the CFR and the ECHR provide, in essence, an 
independent basis for EU nationals to challenge measures adopted by Member States 
in their capacity not as sovereigns (acta jure imperii) but as private economic (and 
commercial) actors (acta jure gestionis).   
 
iv.  BIT ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
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     The argument of protection “deficit”, from which EU investment guarantees seem to 
suffer, if compared to the respective intra-EU BITs standards, finds its most articulate 
expression in the context of arbitration clauses, typically incorporated in BITs. Under 
this procedural alternative, conceive as a “holy gift” to the investor’s disposal, any 
measure allegedly constituting a breach of the substantive guarantees provided in a 
BIT, could be brought, directly by the investor, under the “ judicial microscope” of an 
international investor-State arbitral tribunal. As  Wälde aptly observed in its Separate 
Opinion in the International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mexico case51,:  
“investor state arbitration does not set up a system of resolving disputes 
between presumed equals as in commercial arbitration, but a system of 
protection of foreign investors that are, by exposure to political risk, lack of 
familiarity with and integration into an alien political, social, cultural, 
commercial, institutional and legal system, at an advantage”.   
    In line with these considerations, if the private investor versus State relationship of 
innate inequality is conceptually akin to the “David and Goliath” biblic constellation, BIT 
investor-State arbitration clauses constitute the only parameter that could, at least 
procedurally, ensure a level playing field between those actors.  
        The tantamount importance of investment arbitration and its indispensable value 
in safeguarding the investor’s rights was also accepted by the Eureko tribunal as factor 
manifesting the irreconcilable of the conceptual and functional inequivalences between 
EU investment guarantees and the intra-EU BITs standards of protection. In the words 
of the tribunal:  
“the third main reason for rejecting the jurisdictional challenge based on 
VCLT Article 59 may be stated simply. An essential characteristic of an 
investor’s rights under the BIT is the right to initiate UNCITRAL arbitration 
proceedings against a State party (as the host State)… Such a consensual 
arbitration under well-established arbitration rules adopted by the United 
Nations, in a  neutral place and with a neutral appointing authority, cannot be 
equated simply with  the legal right to bring legal proceedings before the 
national courts of the host state; and, moreover, the locus standi of an 
investor under the BIT, with its broad definition  of “indirect” investments 
under Article 1, is unlikely to be replicated under the court procedures of an 
EU Member State52”  
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     Indeed, EU Law does not provide for any mechanism, identical, or even comparable 
to the international investor – State arbitration, under the auspices of which, an 
individual may directly sue a State, claiming violation of his rights due to a 
governmental interference. According to Article 258 and 259 TFEU, actions against 
Member States can be brought only by other Member States or by the Commission, 
where it is deemed necessary.  
    In light of these considerations, it is more than evident that the equivalence 
argument set forth by the respondent States in the majority of intra-EU investment 
arbitrations,  lacks of  these solid conceptual foundations that would facilitate its further 
development.  
    Eventually, the most important element in answering the question of potential 
overlap and incompatibility of the BIT standards with the EU Law principles, is the fact 
that those standards relate to different legal relationships and guarantee different rights 
. In this regard, it shall be concluded, that even in a case were the same claim may be 
validly raised based on one of those provisions, this does not render them overlapping 
and even more, the application or the invocation of one does not excludes the 
applicability or threatens the validity of the other. 
 
 
d. THE  “INTENTION OF THE PARTIES” CTITERION 
 
    The first cause of tacit abrogation of an earlier treaty pursuant to Article 59 VCLT is 
based on a subjective criterion relating to the common intention of the parties as an 
uncontested “evidence” to support that the replacement the former treaty by the latter 
was the indeed, the ultimate “desideratum” of the contracting states.  
     In the intra-EU Bits, the practice of the majority of EU Member States, clearly at 
odds with the alleged will to terminate their inter se IIA’s, manifestly demonstrates the 
clear and absolute absence of any concrete intention of States to subject the regulation 
of intra-EU investments exclusively to the EU Law. The issue of intra-EU validity and 
applicability was not “visited” in the course of accession processes or in the 
consultations following accession53, but also, the wording of the Accession Treaties 
says nothing in this regard.  In the Eureko tribunal’s words:  
 “There is,  however, no evidence of any intention that the provisions of EU 
law should result in  the termination of the entire BIT. Nothing in the text of 
the EU treaties produces that  result; and the necessary intention is not 
                                                 
53
 Eastern sugar, para.151 
   
  -34- 
established by extraneous evidence. Indeed,  such evidence as there is 
indicates that there was no or, at least, no clear intention that  the BIT should 
be terminated by any of the CSFR Association Agreement, the  Association 
Agreement, the Accession Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty54”.  
        Member States remained that silent also in the context of the Lisbon “competence 
shift” and its implication in the area of EU CCP, as well as vis-à-vis the ECJ’s 
involvement in the review of compatibility of some extra-EU BITs cases. Further, they 
seem to hold diametrically opposing views on whether accession in the EU develops 
termination effect with regards to prior concluded treaties. In fact, some intra-EU BITs 
have been modified after the events of EU enlargements e.g. the Germany-Poland BIT.  
    But even if, arguendo, the intention of Member States could be otherwise manifested 
of even implicitly inferred, it shall be noted that, the BITs themselves and the 
framework of protection provided therein per se, functions as an factor indicative of the 
parties genuine will on how exactly they wished to regulate the issue at stake, in a 
substantive but also procedural level. In this respect, the substantial, specific, 
indispensable nature of protective standards provided under BITs, as legal safeguards 
to the investor’s disposal, does not leave much space to even speculate the existence 
of EU Member States intention, to explicitly or implicitly confirm EU Law as the ultimate 
and sole successor of the intra-EU BITs, by entirely displacing them. Therefore, as it 
has been accepted also by the Eureko tribunal, it is seriously doubtful whether the 
signatories of an intra-EU BIT could genuinely intended to replace the specialized and 
comprehensive BIT regime by a more general framework of protection such the one 
provided by the TFEU55. 
 
e. “INCOMPATIBILITY” OF PROVISIONS OF THE LATER TREATY WITH 
THOSE OF THE EARLIER TREATY 
 
       Under Article 59 VCLT(1)(b), there is another circumstance permitting the implied 
abrogation of the earlier treaty, that relates to the “impossible” of its simultaneous 
application with the later, due to the severe incompatibilities of its provisions with those 
of the other treaty. In asserting whether and under which circumstances the objective 
criterion of “incompatibility” is met, a leading VCLT Commentary quotes the 1963 ILC 
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Report 56where it was emphasized that “the existence of an incompatibility between two 
treaties shall create, above all, a strong presumption that the intention of the parties 
was to abrogate the previous treaty; a presumption that could not be set aside unless 
there were elements to establish a contrary will of the states”. Such a presumption 
regarding the intentions of the contracting parties is absent in the case of intra-EU 
BITs, as it has been already demonstrated57. 
     Furthermore, the VCLT Drafting Committee has suggested that the existence of a 
mere differentiation in the material scope of the two treaties cannot necessarily or 
securely imply incompatibility. This approach has been endorsed by the Easter Sugar 
tribunal, which concluded that “the fact that the rights are unequal does not make them 
incompatible”58. In fact, where the earlier treaty in provides for a broader scope of 
protection than that of the later one, this difference shall be deemed to constitute a 
source of additional, complementary protection rather an incompatibility.  
    This is particularly relevant in the context of the intra-EU BITs and the TFEU. It is 
clear that although those two regimes are of sui generis nature and demonstrate 
significant conceptual and functional divergences, the guarantees they contain 
essentially commit to the attainment of the same goal, namely to the protection of 
investors/ market participants against the host State/ other EU Member States. Under 
this prism these guarantees cannot be considered as incompatible with each other.       
Therefore, it shall be concluded, that since neither the subjective nor the objective 
criterion set forth by Article 59 VCLT are fulfilled , Article 59 VCLT cannot provide for 
an answer to legal conundrum of the tacit abrogation of the intra-EU BITs by the TFEU. 
 
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 30 VCLT 
 
      In the battle to clarify the status of intra-EU BITs vis-à-vis EU Law, Article 30 VCLT 
has also been invoked from the respondents in the prominent Eastern Sugar and 
Eureko arbitrations, as a possible ground for not their invalidity but the inapplicability of 
some of their provisions found to be incompatible with the EU.  
     Article 30 (3) VCLT operates as a “second chance” provision in the sense that, 
where application of Article 59 VCLT has been excluded, the operation of the earlier 
treaty can still be diminished, however not with regards to all of its provisions but in an 
ad hoc basis. More specifically, Article 30 (3) VCLT inserts a “priority rule” activation of 
which could render inapplicable those provisions of the earlier treaty that are found 
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incompatible with the provisions of the subsequent treaty.  This “incompatibility” 
criterion was invoked by the Commission in the Eureko case as present in the case of 
the Dutch-Slovak BIT, particularly with regards to the investor-State arbitral mechanism 
provided therein under Article 8 of the BIT59.   
       As it has been already demonstrated, arbitration clauses contained in BITs provide 
for the direct attribution of an enforceable right to the investor to bring a claim against 
the host State, for matters arising out of an investment, before a binding adjudicatory 
mechanism operating under the rule of law. At the other side of the spectrum, the EU 
judicial system is based upon the general jurisdiction of national courts and does not 
provide for the possibility of an alternative international judicial forum, where an 
investor could directly sue a Member State alleging breach of his rights under the 
respective protection framework. On this basis, how could those two distinct regimes 
could be rendered incompatible in the sense that the application of the one necessarily 
violates the other?  
     The answer the Eureko tribunal gave, when confronted by the argument of 
incompatibility of investor-State arbitration and EU Law, was the following:  
“There is no rule of EU law that prohibits investor-State arbitration. Far  from 
it: transnational arbitration is a commonplace throughout the EU, including  
arbitrations between legal persons and States; and the European Court of 
Justice has  given several indications of how questions of EU law should be 
handled in the course  of arbitrations, including important questions of public 
policy. It cannot be asserted  that all arbitrations that involve any question of 
EU law are conducted in violation of  EU law. The argument that the 
availability of arbitration for some but not all EU investors would amount to 
discrimination in violation of EU law was addressed  above, where it was 
decided that the answer is to extend rights and not to cancel them”60.  
 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
        It shall be by now clear that, from an international law perspective and pursuant to 
an analysis centered around the relative international law norms on treaty-conflicts 
resolution, the question whether intra-EU BITs remain valid and applicable shall be 
answered to the affirmative. Further, the partially overlapping scope between intra-EU 
BITs and the comparable EU investment protection guarantees, albeit not to be 
disputed, does not suffice to render those regimes incompatible with each other. 
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Neither Member States shall be conceived as “suffering” from any “contradictory 
obligations” dilemma when required to fulfill their engagements deriving either from BIT 
or from TFEU provisions. Rather, intra-EU BITs shall be construed as a more 
comprehensive and thus, complementary source of protection afforded to the investors 
that could certainly operate in conjunction with the EU protection norms and counter-
balance the deficiencies, evident within the EU system of protection.  
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CHAPTER 5   
 
INTRA-EU BITS: IN HARMONY OR IN VARIANCE WITH EU LAW? 
 
 
As getting into the core of this legal conundrum surrounding intra-EU BITs compatibility 
with EU Law, the fundamental question that arises is the following: is there really a 
conflict?  
  
A. ARE DIFERRENT STANDARTDS OF PROTECTION COMPATIBLE 
WITH THE EU? 
 
      In order to determine this issue a preliminary remark is necessary: the mere lack of 
conceptually or structurally identical -substantively or-and procedurally- standards of 
protection between two competing frameworks, which may entail divergences in the 
width of the protection afforded, cannot per se be regarded as a sufficient ground to 
allege an opposition or an irreconcilable conflict between these co-existing protective 
frameworks.  
      As a matter of fact, the EU Law, even in the post-Lisbon era, nowhere expressly 
mandates the unification or even the harmonization of intra-EU investment protection 
or dictates compliance with any protection minima or maxima of EU origin, neither 
proceeds in preventing Member States from adopting a more comprehensive 
framework of protection that grants higher level of security an certainty to foreign 
investors through a BIT. Thus, Member States are in principio not precluded from EU 
Law to provide additional -to what is already granted by other regimes- protection to 
investors operating in their territory and essentially to enhance and even optimize the 
position of the investor vis-à-vis the host State’s sovereign powers61.  
    Hence, the existence of intra-EU BITs operating as a complementary source of 
protection extending the spectrum and enhancing the volume of protection afforded to 
foreign investors by the EU Law, cannot be conceived per se as opposing to the 
fundamental principles of EU Law. Those co-existing regimes, even from a slightly 
different angle and in different degree of intensity, essentially pursue the same goal i.e. 
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obligations under international law existing at present or established hereafter between the Contracting 
Parties in addition to the present Agreement contain rules, whether general or specific, entitling 
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party to a treatment more favorable than is provided for 
by the present Agreement, such rules shall to the extent that they are more favorable prevail over the 
present Agreement”. 
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the protection of the investor  and the liberalization and incentivisation of inbound 
cross-border investment 62. From this perspective, as Söderlund puts it, intra-EU BITs 
“are in harmony, and not at variance, with EC law63”.   
 
B. THE DISCRIMINATION ARGUMENT AND THE EXCLUSIVE ECJ 
JURISDICTION 
 
    One of the most crucial aspects of the conceived normative clash between intra-EU 
BITs and EU Law, relates to the allegedly discriminatory effect of their application that 
directly violates EU fundamental principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. 
Under this perspective, their survival within the EU investment scene and their 
simultaneous application with the TFEU provisions could seriously disrupt the 
“equilibrium” achieved by the operation of these overarching EU principles and entail 
the establishment of a two-speed investment protection framework within the a highly 
integrated area, as the EU Legal order.  
         The EU concerns particularly concentrate on the procedural “opportunity” 
accorded exclusively to foreign investors covered by an intra-EU BIT to enforce the 
substantive rights granted under the IIA through an alternative “path”, namely trough 
the investor-State arbitration64.  
     Indeed, the conferral of a direct right to pursue claims on violation of his rights 
against the host State trough investment arbitration instead of seeking redness in the 
national court systems, constitutes a considerable advantage to the disposal of intra-
EU BIT covered investors. Since this alternative forum for investment disputes 
resolution is not available to investors falling outside the BIT’s scope ratione personae 
(i.e. to these investors covered by the TFEU investment protection framework), 
investor-State arbitration as a “procedural addition” to the scope of intra-EU BITs 
protective framework could allegedly lead to the preferential treatment of BIT-covered 
investors (more favorable treatment than that enjoyed by an investor not covered by a 
BIT) , a phenomenon prohibited within the EU, under Article 18 TFEU and the principle 
of non-discrimination65. As Hindelang puts it, “not each and every Member State 
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 However, the following considerations shall be deemed to apply, mutatis mutandis, also with regards to 
the majority-if not the entirety- of the  intra-EU BITs protective standards, if challenged under the non-
discrimination argument. 
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 A doctrinally coherent analysis of the discrimination argument requires a thorough understanding of who 
exactly Article 18 TFEU, seeks to protect when stipulating that “any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited”. Under this perspective, the prohibition of non-discrimination shall be 
conceived as conceptually and functionally underpinned by the principle of equal treatment which 
mandates the treatment of comparable situations in the same manner. Where the treatment between two 
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maintains BITSs with all other Members. In such a situation, a host-State might be 
perceived to be granting an EU investor protected by a BIT more favorable treatment 
than an EU investor not protected by a BIT. Not being justifiable, this situation is 
prohibited by the fundamental freedoms.  
     Nevertheless, does the inclusion of the investor-State arbitration “avenue” in the 
intra-EU BITs, even if it potentially constitutes a source of differential  treatment 
between intra-EU investor, particularly given its absence as an option under the EU 
investment protection framework, generates any obligation to Member States to 
eliminate it as a possibility by terminating their intra-EU BITs?  
      The arbitral tribunal in the Eureko case, instead of engaging in an analysis of 
the discriminatory or not effect of intra-EU BITs, preferred to emphasize again the 
complementary nature of the rights conferred under the intra-EU BITs and further, to 
provide an answer to this important question. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that: 
“There is moreover no reason, legal or practical, why an EU Member State 
should not accord to investors of all other EU Member States rights equivalent 
to those which the State has bound itself to accord to investors of its EU 
bilateral investment treaty partners – or, indeed, to investors from States that 
are not members of the EU.  Certainly, it is not for an arbitral tribunal to cancel 
rights created by a valid treaty in order to safeguard a State party against the 
possibility that it might one day decide to apply the treaty in a way that could 
violate its obligations under one or more other later treaties66”.   
 
        Under this perspective, discrimination issues, if eventually present in the context 
of intra-EU BITs, could be resolved in two ways: a) by elimination of the preferential 
treatment at stake or b) by extending the privilege to all others being in the same 
situation under the Most Favored Nation constellation dictating the equal treatment of 
all individuals (here, of all the investors operating in the territory of a Member State) 
according to the highest standard granted to any of them. The Eureko tribunal clearly 
was in favor of the latter solution. And as it seems, it was not the only one.  
      The same position was adopted also by the ECJ in the Matteucci case where the 
Court reviewed the status of a cultural bilateral agreement between Belgium and 
Germany through the prism of the fundamental, under the Community Law, principles 
of non-discrimination and equal treatment. The ECJ acknowledged that by establishing 
                                                                                                                                               
is situations is different, the crucial element to assert discrimination is whether those situations are similar, 
or not. If they are not, then the differential treatment does not constitute a problematic issue under the 
principle of equality. If they are similar, then the differential treatment, if not justifiable, constitutes a 
discrimination prohibited under Article 18 TFEU.  
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 E Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and 
Suspension (Perm. Ct. Arb., Oct. 26, 2010), para. 267. 
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and granting of rights only in favor of nationals of Belgium and Germany, this intra-EU 
bilateral agreement was discriminating against nationals of other Member States, thus 
violating the principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of discrimination, the pillars 
of the EU structure. What the Court did not do, despite being confronted by a gross and 
direct breach of the principle of non-discrimination, was to demand the disapplication or 
termination of the concerned Treaty. Rather, it ordered the “multilateralization” of the 
benefits granted by virtue of this Agreement by extending them also to nationals of 
other Member States as a solution to alleviate this conflict. 
    The ECJ adopted the same stance in the Saint Gobain case, by pointing out the 
unilateral extension of advantages deriving from a Germany-US and a Germany-Swiss 
agreement on the avoidance of double taxation, from Germany to economic operators 
established in other Member States, as the most appropriate solution to eliminate the 
discriminatory effects present in the given case. In the same lines were the ECJ’s 
judgements in the Gottardo and in the Open Skies cases. 
     From this point of view, an attempt from the Member States to reconcile their 
commitments under an intra-EU BIT with the EU non-discrimination prohibition, by 
extending the privileges afforded by the BIT also to investors having the nationality of 
other Member States, is an approach in principle welcomed by the EU Law, as it has 
been demonstrated by the ECJ’s jurisprudence, confirming the existence of a MFN-
treatment obligation also in the EU legal order67.   
     However, in its observations submitted to the Eureko arbitral tribunal, the EU 
Commission rejected the suggestion that discrimination could be resolved positively, by 
operation of the MFN-treatment constellation, hence, not by eliminating the investor-
State arbitration mechanism but by extending the preferential treatment i.e. the 
jurisdictional privileges deriving from the BIT arbitration clauses, also to investors from 
other EU Member States6869 
    The Commission perceived a potential application of the MFN treatment structure as 
“unacceptable from an institutional EU law perspective and as misunderstanding of the 
EU judicial system, which is “firmly opposed to the ‘outsourcing’ of disputes involving 
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 See supra, note 13.  
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 Eureko BV v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and 
Suspension (Perm. Ct. Arb., Oct. 26, 2010), para. 184 
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 The possibility of extending procedural rights, including the right to resort to arbitration,  to third parties 
by operation of the MFN treatment clause has already been affirmed in the leading Mafezzini case, where 
the tribunal held that “if a third-party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more 
favorable ... than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneﬁciary of the 
[MFN] clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle”. para 56) 
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EU law” to tribunals outside the EU courts, for the reasons set out by the ECJ in the 
MOX Plant case”70.  
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CHAPTER 6.  
 
 STATE AID LAW CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTRA-EU BITs 
INVESTMENT ARBITRAL AWARDS 
 
      Probably as one of the most practically important of the multifaceted and 
multileveled implications resulting in from the confrontation between two legal norms, 
EU Law and intra-EU BITs, relates to the EU State Aid regime. The tension generated 
by this confrontation basically derive from the simple fact that during the course of the 
“journey” to transform the EU integration envisagement to a fully tangible reality, and 
particularly at the events of Union’s enlargements,  EU law may –and already has-
mandated the adoption by the Member States of measures  that eventually contradict 
with and arguably undermine obligations undertaken by the States vis-à-vis foreign 
investors, in the form of investment guarantees stemming out of BITs and closely relate 
to the economic value of the investment (e.g. subsidies). At the point where these 
autonomous sets of obligations, of EU and of international origin respectively, clash, 
the fragments of this collision could seriously injure investment protection under BITs. 
 
A. AN OUTLINE OF THE EU STATE AID REGIME 
   
    The core provision of the EU State Aid control system, is Article 107(1) TFEU , which 
states that, “save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member 
State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market”. 
     Under this regime Member States are generally prohibited from granting any 
financial measure conferring an economic advantage to undertakings, with the notion 
conceptually encompassing also investors as independent economic actors operating 
in an organized and strategically structured manner, that are capable of developing a 
distortive effect on competition within the EU.  The activation of the principal prohibition 
of State aid as a “phenomenon” prima facie incompatible with the conceptual and 
purposive dimensions of EU internal market, is premised on the fulfillment of five 
constituent elements and conditions. Accordingly, a financial intervention qualifies as 
State aid when the below criteria are cumulatively met: 
   
  -44- 
a) the concerned financial measure is imposed by a public authority and its granted by 
the State or through State sources (doctrine of imputability) 
b) confers an economic advantage or benefit to the recipient(s) 
c) favors certain undertakings or the production of certain goods over others (selectivity 
criterion) 
d) must distort or threaten to distort competition and 
e) must be capable of affecting intra-EU trade  
      Where the normative requirements of Article 107 TFEU are fulfilled with regards to 
a specific measure brought under the EU State Aid Law scrutiny, the Member State to 
which the pertinent measure is attributed is enjoined to promptly recover from the 
recipient any illegal aid granted so as to re-stabilize the disrupted competition 
environment. 
 
 
B. HOW DOES THE EU STATE AID REGIME PENETRATE IN THE AREA OF 
INTRA-EU AWARDS ENFORCEMENT? 
 
     The EU State Aid Law enters the intra-EU BITs “universe” usually in the context of 
some benefits granted as inducements to investors by the host States prior to their 
accession to the EU and in accordance to their national laws. At the moment of EU 
accession, these attractive “deal-sweeteners”, granted by the Member States to induce 
investors into investing in their territory and perhaps in a specific sector and constitute 
an integral, essential part of the promotion and protection package covering a particular 
investment, are may be transformed to unlawful State Aids, incompatible with the 
internal market and thus irreconcilable with EU Law. Exposed to contrarian obligations 
deriving from EU and from international law respectively, the Member States are 
confronted by a major dilemma; to retain or to reclaim the illegal State Aid; because at 
the same time that they are requested to withdraw and recover unauthorized illegal 
State Aid, i.e. to fulfill what has been pronounced as a supervening, core EU obligation 
by the ECJ and the Commission, (and is subject to Commission prosecution, fines and 
private damages actions if it fails to do so) they are additionally –and equally- bound to 
comply with their international law obligation deriving from the BITs, not to disrupt the 
environment surrounding the investment. From a doctrinally more coherent 
perspective, what is seriously jeopardized in this context, is the sensitive balance 
between the investor’s legitimate expectations to retention of a given status quo and 
the State’s regulatory interests and further, duties as the architects of the EU acquis.  
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      Invocation of such pre-accession inducements would very likely bring Member 
States under the judicial “eye” of an arbitral tribunal, where the act of withdraw could be 
challenged as an alleged infringement of a Member State’s obligation to respect and 
comply with the protective standards deriving from the respective BIT covering the 
investment at stake. Possible bases for such challenge could constitute the 
requirement of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ of investors, guarantees of most-favoured 
nation (MFN) and national treatment, and protection from expropriation, some of the 
protective standards conceived to “safeguard” the continuity of the measure at stake. 
The initiation of arbitration proceedings against the Member State could possibly 
produce a dictum in favor of the investor that is followed by an international obligation 
imposed to the courts of the fora where enforcement is sought, to effectuate the 
tribunal’s order on damages.   
     At this very point emerges the problematique around of the issue of State’s 
compliance or not with intra EU arbitral awards, as seen through the prism of EU State 
Aid Law. This penetration of EU State Aid rules in the context of investment Law can 
open the Pandora’s box regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards and particularly 
the compliance with judicial verdicts ordering compensation in damages to alleviate a 
demonstrated breach of the investor rights under the BIT framework by the act of Aid 
revocation by the governmental “hand”.  This is because, any payment of damages to 
be made by the State in compliance with such an award could per se be conceived 
from an EU perspective and particularly through the Commission’s eyes, as a violation 
of the EU State Aid rule of Article 107 TFEU, to the extent that it de facto re-allocates to 
the investor the economic advantage he previously enjoyed and was deprived of due to 
its withdraw.     
 
 
C. GETTING AT THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM: THE DOCTRINE OF 
IMPUTABILITY AND ITS RELEVANCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH AN INTRA-EU 
AWARD IN GENERAL 
 
       Central in examining the problem compliance with intra-EU awards from the EU 
State Aid Law perspective, and as the ECJ has ofttimes concluded, and the decisive 
parameter in deciding the existence or not of illegal State Aid where such awards are 
eventually effectuated, is the doctrine of imputability.  
     According to the doctrine of imputability, only measures that were voluntarily 
adopted by the public authorities through some sort of action imputable to them, could 
qualify as State Aid falling under the normative scope of Article 107 TFEU. In this 
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context, the element of voluntariness is fulfilled where the measure not only is granted 
through State resources from an economical point of view, but “the deployment of such 
resources could actually be attributed to some form of government decision”71. This 
interpretation sheds light to the conceptual anatomy of the doctrine of imputability. Two 
are the constituent elements here: the corpus or objective element, demonstrated in 
the existence of a State’s formal action to adopt the measure at stake e.g. in a form of 
decision, and the animus or subjective element manifested in the quality of the State’s 
action as a sua sponte act in which the State intends to proceed on its own volition.  
    In this sense, no issue of contradiction or compatibility with Article 107 TFEU should 
rise in cases where the this animus element is absent i.e. where the decision to 
compensate is not adopted  voluntarily by the Member States, it is not driven by 
intention but instead, it is somehow imposed. In this context, and as a matter of 
principle, it should be accepted that payments made as compensation for damages 
according to the rules governing compensation of illegal acts attributed to the State do 
not qualify as State Aid. As the Commission has clarified “the existence of an 
advantage should be ruled out in the case of… an obligation condemnation on the 
national authorities to compensate for damage they have caused to certain  
undertakings or the payment of compensation for an expropriation72. 
    Hence, from this perspective, even if the Commission’s statement does not 
expressly refers to arbitral awards, there no reason for to infer by analogy that 
compliance with an intra-EU arbitral award, equally as with a court decision, ordering 
compensation in damages does not prima facie and without further qualification 
constitute a violation of the EU State Aid Law73.  
     At the nucleus of this argument excluding compensation granted by virtue of a 
judicial order from the scope of Article 107 TFEU, lies a fundamental the assumption 
enunciated in the Asteris case concerning the claim of some Greek firms on 
compensation by the State in respect of lost legitimate aid and the question whether 
payment of such compensation qualifies as illegal State Aid. According to the ECJ’s 
ruling, “State Aid… is fundamentally different in its legal mature from damages which 
the competent national authorities may be ordered to pay to individuals in 
compensation for the damages they have caused to those individuals”. The 
Commission elaborated further on the conceptual distance separating  State Aid from 
the judicially born obligation to pay damages in the Akzo Nobel case and confirmed 
that payment of damages to the recipient does not amount to illegal State Aid insofar 
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the recipient is entitled to such payment under the rules of the applicable law in the 
sense that his right to be reimbursed is deemed to be recognized as legitimate by the 
competent judicial authorities and according to judicial interpretation of the law 
governing the issue74.  
     In that sense, to the extent that payment of damages comes as the fulfillment of a 
legal duty to compensate, as a de jure obligation legally substantiated and judicially 
recognized –or at least recognizable-, the imputability criterion is not met because the 
pertinent obligation is a creature of law and cannot be attributed to a State’s action as 
the Article’s 107 TFEU normative structure prescripts. Here, the decision to 
compensate is not generated intentionally, as a State’s willful act; instead it is 
introduced by operation of law in the sense that it’s “birth” is not subject to the State’s 
discretion. Hence the applicability of State Aid prohibition shall be ruled out as the 
imputability element is absent.  
    The Akzo Nobel conceptual “dynamic” can, in principio and by analogy, be trans-
positioned in the area of Intra-EU investment awards although under the light of some 
crucial clarifications. The fundamental question arising in this context is whether the 
Akzo Nobel constellation could be invoked in order for the payment of damages to rule 
out an alleged breach the 107 TFEU prohibition, equally in cases where the entitlement 
to compensation derives from an intra-EU BIT and by virtue of the standards of 
protection enshrined therein, instead from the national law.  
     From a stricto sensu assessment, it could be argued that in the absence of an 
arbitral award obliging a Member State to pay compensation, to base a voluntary 
payment by the State merely on the theoretical existence of the recipient’s respective 
right deriving from an alleged but not adjudicated breach of the BIT, does not suffices 
to rule out a violation of 107 TFEU. This is because the sui generis nature of the 
protective standards under the BIT frameworks and their broad wording leaving 
considerable space for conceptual divergences and interpretative maneuvering by the 
arbitral tribunals, which are not bound by precedence even in cases of jurisprudence 
constante, do not provide for that solid background to legally substantiate the existence 
of a right to compensation as the Akzo Nobel “escape road” requires.  
     On the contrary, the existence of an award confirming and externalizing the ex lege 
obligation of the State to pay compensation which derives from the applicable treaty is 
a sufficient ground for concluding that  the decision to pay is not imputable to the State, 
thus payment shall be deemed as not constituting illegal State Aid. The Akzo Nobel 
reference to national law shall be interpreted broadly as encompassing any form of 
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legislation constituting or implementing such a binding obligation to compensate 
including an international investment agreement as an international law instrument, 
legally binding and directly applicable to the relations between the investor and the host 
State.  
      Thus, insofar the duty to compensate emerges by operation of the international law 
as authoritatively assessed under the aegis of an binding adjudicatory procedure as the 
investment arbitration is, the imputability criterion shall be deemed as not met and 
therefore, payment made by a Member State to the prejudiced investor in effectuating 
this legal duty do not fall under the normative scope of 107 TFEU. In this sense, EU 
State Aid provisions cannot be invoke so as to limit or exclude the enforceability of an 
arbitral award on damages.  
 
D. THE PROBLEM OF COMPENSATION AS RE-INSTALLMENT OF REVOKED 
ILLEGAL STATE AID  
  
     A different problematique arises where the arbitral award by ordering compensation 
does not merely aims to the alleviation of the loss suffered by the investor due to a 
breach of his rights deriving from a BIT, but in substance, it mandates the de facto re-
installment of an illegal State Aid measure previously enjoyed by the investor. This is 
usually the case when a Member State proceeds to the revocation or termination, as 
incompatible with the EU State Aid regime, of a measure in favor of the investor, 
usually a deal-sweetener. Confronted by the withdraw of the beneficial measure that 
substantially alters the existed status quo surrounding his investment, the investor will 
allege a breach of the investment treaty and claim from an arbitral tribunal to order his 
compensation by the State. Where the tribunal affirms the investor’s allegations, 
payment of compensation would amount to a reallocation of the revoked economic 
benefit which was regarded as incompatible with the 107 TFEU..  
   This was the scenario in Micula, a case brought under the Sweden-Romania BIT 
concerning the partial withdraw by Romania of certain investment incentives 
implemented in its legislation, in particular a series of regional aid, as incompatible with 
the EU State Aid scheme. As the claim brought by a group of Swedish investors 
arguing that the revocation of the regional aid constituted a violation of their legitimate 
expectations, was upheld by the ICSID arbitral tribunal, a serious threat to intra-EU 
awards enforceability was revealed. Followings its amicus curiae intervention in the 
ICSID proceedings emphasizing the gross incompatibility of the payment of 
compensation with the EU State Aid scheme, the EU Commission order on March 
2014 the suspension of any payment to be made in compliance with the Micula award 
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until the completion of the formal investigation procedure under Article 4(4) of the State 
Aid Regulation and eventually, on March 2015 declared that the payment of the 
compensation awarded by the tribunal to the claimants “constitutes State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty which is  incompatible with the internal 
market”75.     
   The Micula case was not the last chapter of this “story” surrounding the enforceability 
of intra-EU awards within the EU legal order. The grave dogmatic conflict between 
those two separated spheres of law and its possible implications was evident, also from 
an EU State Aid Law perspective, in a series of ICSID cases against Hungary, 
including the Electrabel SA V Hungary, and the AES Summit v Hungary, concerning 
the revocation of tariff schemes granted in power purchase agreements which were 
found contrary to the EU State Aid framework. The AES tribunal referred to this conflict 
of obligations lying at the nucleus of the clash between EU State Aid rules and the BITs 
protection framework and the State’s dilemma between honoring the investor’s 
legitimate expectations or exercising their regulatory prerogatives and imperatives to 
implement in its full effect the EU State Aid rules and possibly proceed in the 
minimization or elimination of prohibited State Aid, as they are obliged to do. In this 
respect, also in this case, the potential payment by Hungary of damages that de facto 
re-implements and re-allocates the withdrawn illegal Aid would constitute a violation of 
the EU State Aid rules and perpetuate the illegal distortion of competition76. 
       It is more than evident that in the future, even more similar cases will monopolize 
the interest in the context of intra-EU awards enforceability and its direct clash with EU 
Law and reveal the dogmatic foundations and the intensity and depth of this 
confrontation, that grossly challenges both system’s orthodoxies.    
      Determinative factor in resolving the legal conundrum of compliance with intra-EU 
awards mandating the re-installment of illegal State Aid, is the nature of compensation 
payed to the prejudiced investor and more importantly, the very objectives underlying 
such payment. To specify, where payment of damages to the investor is made through 
a measure that, albeit formally qualifying as compensation, from an objective point of 
view it manifestly deviates from serving the exclusive purpose of compensation in its 
restorative function by seeking to return to the investor the amount of money 
corresponding to what was revoked as illegal State Aid and thereby eventually entails 
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the direct or indirect granting of a new illegal aid, it shall be deemed as ipso facto 
violating Article 107 TFEU77. This is because the purpose underpinning the institution 
of compensation in this context, is not the obtainment of the illegal economic 
advantage previously enjoyed, even if it was legitimately expected from the investor not 
to be deprived of it, as this would equal to a de facto preservation of an illegal status 
quo within the EU capable of eventually trigger the collapse of the EU State Aid 
system. 
     Therefore, in an attempt to safeguard the enforceability of intra-EU awards, 
particularly in cases where a violation of the investor’s legitimate expectations under 
the intra-EU BIT generates the State’s duty to pay damages, the compensation may 
escape falling under the normative umbrella of the 107 TFEU if the payable sums are 
thusly calculated as  to cover not the actual loss the investor suffered -or could suffer- 
from the revocation of the illegal State Aid, as that would constitute a de facto 
reallocation of the lost economic benefit and thus a repayment of illegal State Aid, 
incompatible with the common market, but rather merely to relieve the investor from the 
wrought frustration and subversion of his legitimate expectations.  
    In case a State proceeds in the payment of compensation in compliance with such 
an intra-EU award, and especially where the Commission has already stressed that 
enforcement of the award would run afoul to EU State Aid regime as incompatible with 
the internal market78, nothing prevents the Commission from initiating infringement 
proceedings under 258 TFEU against that State which, in executing the award ordering 
compensation of the investor, has ipso facto violated the EU Law. Under the threat of 
infringement proceedings, pending above them more active than ever, it is strongly 
questionable whether a Member State would voluntarily comply with such an award. 
Rather, it follows almost automatically, that when confronted with the dilemma of 
complying with the international law obligation or prioritize the uniform and effective 
application of the EU Law, the latter option is more likely to prevail.  
 
E. EU STATE AID LAW AS A “BLOCKER” OF INTRA-EU AWARDS 
ENFORCEABILITY  
 
         As a matter of principle, it is upon the arbitral tribunals discretion to decide if and 
to which extent the nature of the revocation at stake as backed by EU Law or the prior 
regime’s characterization as illegal in accordance with EU rules are relevant to its 
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assessment and would eventually affect its final verdict. The stance the tribunal will 
adopt with regards to the autonomous interpretation of the EU rules in this context, 
strongly depends upon the extent and the quality of EU Law’s penetration in the arbitral 
proceedings, and its status as the applicable law to the merits of the dispute –or part 
from it- or only as a fact. There is no unanimity within the arbitral jurisprudence with 
regards to whether and to what extent EU Law enjoys a prioritized status in intra-EU 
investment arbitrations. At least according to the  AES tribunal view, “EU law has a 
dual nature: on the one hand, it is an international law regime, on the other hand, once 
introduced in the national legal orders, it is part of these legal orders. It is common 
ground that in an international arbitration national laws are to be considered as facts.” 
      However, this is how things are done within the international legal order.  As the 
hierarchy of legal norms is different within the EU legal order this flexibility and 
elasticity with regards to the application of EU Law is turned to an overriding obligation 
to, at any event, ensure its unequivocal, uniform and effective implementation. In this 
context, EU Law is accorded the status of the supreme rule of law. Thus, where an 
arbitral award is conceived by an EU judicial “eye” as a product of EU Law’s fallacious 
application or circumvention, particularly with regards to its overriding public policy 
provisions and uncontested imperative of their direct and unconditional application, its 
enforceability within the EU order may very well be questioned and thereby seriously 
shake the foundations of investor-State Arbitration as a final and binding adjudicatory 
mechanism. It shall be mentioned however, that the render of an intra-EU award 
unenforceable by an EU national court under EU State Aid Law consideration, does not 
impede or affect otherwise the practical opportunities od the investor to enforce the 
award in other legal orders outside the EU.   
 
I.  ENFORECEMENT UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION ON THE 
RECODNITION AND ENFORECEMNT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS 
 
     As an intra-EU award ordering the re-installment of illegal state aid enters the 
recognition and enforcement stage in an EU forum under the New York Convention’s 
auspices, the real action begins, since EU national courts have the last word on the 
award’s recognition and enforcement and may deny it on the grounds of public policy, 
where enforcement of such an award would be directly in conflict with the EU 
mandatory provisions on prohibited State Aid under Article V (2)(b) of the New York 
Convention.  
     Admittedly, EU State Aid rules are considered as one of dogmatic pillars of the EU 
Competition policy and certainly one of the most fundamental aspects of what 
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constitutes the EU public policy. The notion encompasses those overarching concepts, 
principles and constellations, infringement of which would produce a manifest 
irregularity or a substantial injustice within the EU legal order and would seriously 
erode the integrity and coherence of the Union’s structures. In the Eco Swiss case the 
ECJ emphatically referred to the imperative under which Member States are to observe 
EU public policy and ensure its application in a consistent and uniform manner. In 
effectuating this obligation Member States may go that far as to even deny recognition 
and enforcement of an award rendered manifestly in violation of the EU public policy79. 
This approach can also be adopted in case of an arbitral award ordering compensation 
that would de facto re-implement the very economic advantage which was revoked as 
incompatible with EU State Aid law.  
     What remains to be answered it whether the Article’s V (2)(b) NYC public policy 
ground for refusal of enforcement rule shall be interpreted as a blanket rule covering all 
cases concerning the revocation of illegal State aid”80, or in a stricto sensu manner as a 
rule to be invoked premised on the existence of a relevant formal declaration by the EU 
Commission on the aids illegality and incompatibility pursuant to Article 108 TFEU. This 
differentiation in the invocability and applicability of the public policy exception develops 
significant practical relevance since it may eventually constitute the key that will either 
unlock or double-lock the enforceability of the pertinent intra-EU award.  
       The approach adopted by the French Court of Cassation in Cytec, a case with 
strong EU Competition Law “scent”, may serve as a valuable guide in answering this 
question. The Court concluded that recognition and enforcement may be denied when 
an award violates EU Competition Law, however, only in the presence of “a 
demonstration of a “flagrant, effective and concrete violation of the EU public policy”. 
Applying this approach in the State Aid context, the existence of an EU Commission’s 
decision declaring the aids incompatibility with the internal market can certainly serve 
as an uncontestable manifestation that the enforcement of such an award ordering the 
re-installment of illegal State Aid would grossly violate the fundamental provisions of 
EU Law on State Aid and as such, it shall be deemed as demonstrating a “flagrant, 
effective and concrete violation of the EU public policy”. In this sense, EU public policy 
ground shall be activated where the enforcement of the award at stake, would entail a 
disregard and a manifest violation of the fundamental EU State aid rules. In the 
presence of a Commission’s decision pursuant to Article 108 TFEU this “manifest 
violation” element is transformed from a relatively vague conceptual constellation to an 
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authoritatively confirmed legal reality. Hence, it would serve as a prima facie 
presumption from which the it could be validly inferred that enforcement of the pertinent 
award would de facto reallocate illegal State Aid and thus it would violate Article 107 
TFEU as integral part of the EU public policy .   
    Therefore, it shall be concluded that application of the Eco Swiss jurisprudence to 
every single case demonstrating a EU public policy dimension without any further 
qualification e.g. the existence of a Commission decision declaring the measures 
illegality, is an over-inclusive approach in conflict with the more restrictive interpretative 
assessment of Article V(2)(b)NYC suggested, –if not mandated- also by the pro-
enforcement bias underpinning the NYC “architecture”81 129.  
     Furthermore, such  an open-ended and unconditioned application of the public 
policy constellation in variety of cases of different backgrounds would mathematically 
trigger the production of a vast amount of divergent interpretations on the notion’s 
conceptual identity, dimensions and limitations. Within such a “mosaic” of the diverging 
views on what eventually constitutes the EU public policy, the attainment of the 
consistent and uniform application of the EU public policy objective pronounced in the 
Eco Swiss as an overarching obligation of the Member States seems, at least, a really 
hard job to do.  This uncertainty surrounding the EU public policy concept would also 
threaten the stability of the another fundamental NYC pillar, the duty of national courts 
seized to enforce, to abstain from proceeding in a review on the merits of the case at 
hand on their way to decide the granting or the refusal of enforcement. In the absence 
of a decision by the Commission on the illegality of the revoked measure, the court of 
enforcement may “indulge” in an evaluation of the merits in order to confirm on its own 
whether the measure revoked violates Article 107 TFEU, something that would run 
afoul to the court’s limited role only to grant or refuse enforcement.  
      In the light of those considerations, it shall be concluded that enforcement of an 
intra-EU arbitral award mandating the re-installment of illegal State Aid shall be refused 
on the grounds of EU public policy violation where the illegality and incompatibility of 
the measure at stake has been assessed and declared by the Commission in the form 
of a decision pursuant to Article 108 TFEU.  
 
C. ENFORCEMENT OF AN INTRA-EU AWARD UNDER THE 
WASHINGTON CONVENTION (ICSID) 
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 Id, pp. 129. 
   
  -54- 
    Within the universe of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) , things are quite different for arbitral awards rendered under the 
Center’s aegis. In the words of the ICSID ad hoc Committee in the MINE V Republic of 
Guinea case, the ICSID Convention “excludes any attack on the award in the national 
courts.” This phrase encapsulates the ICSID’s character as a self-contained and self-
executing system, stemming from Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention. 
       Particularly Article 54 ICSID introduces an overarching obligation according to 
which: “Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to the 
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award 
within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State”. In this sense, 
final awards rendered under the ICSID auspices, are conceived to be binding and 
surrounded by a protective “cloak” which immunes them from any scrutiny by national 
courts with regards to their recognition and enforcement and eliminates any defensive 
ground, even that of public policy violation, that could block their effectuation.   
     However, the recent EU Commission’s decision to issue an suspension injunction in 
order to “freeze” the enforcement by Romania, of the Micula award, rendered under the 
ICSID auspices, relying on the circumstance that EU is not party to the ICSID and thus, 
not bound by the Article 54 obligation to ensure enforcement, exposed a loophole in 
the conceived as well-insulated self-executing ICSID structure and further revealed the 
intricate nature of the interplay between EU Law and international investment norms as 
the ICSID Convention.  
     Although not in violation of the ICSID Convention stricto sensu, this suspension 
injection constitutes in essence a direct mandate to the Member State to contravene 
ICSID and breach its international law obligations. It is questionable whether the Kadi 
approach on the normatively hierarchical precedence accorded to the core principles 
and structures of EU Law when confronted by irreconcilable international law 
obligations fulfillment of which would erode “the very foundations of the Community’s 
legal order”82, could justify a blithe disregard of international law by the EU Law, and, 
by analogy, constitute a solid basis for obstructing ICSID awards enforceability. Under 
Article 27 VCLT, States are precluded from invoking provisions of their internal law, 
and therefore also EU Law provisions as integrally incorporated within the Member 
States legal orders, in order to justify failure to comply with obligations stemming from 
an international law instrument.  
    In this context, the conceptual constellation adopted by the EU, pronouncing a 
distinction between the EU international obligations and the international obligation of 
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the Member States, from which the argument ICSID irrelevance from an EU Law 
perspective stems, does not suffices to “purify” the imposition of EU Law originated 
obstacles to the fulfillment of international law obligations, as the enforcement of ICSID 
awards. As a matter of fact, the incorporation of ICSID investment arbitration as one of 
the possible “venues” for dispute resolution under Article 26 of the ECT, the 
“constitution” of energy investments that the EU brought in life, manifests how narrow 
and particularistic the approach adopted by the EU is, to consider itself as legally 
detached from the ICSID Convention. “From this point of view”, as Ortolani aptly 
submits, “ the ICSID Convention should be regarded as having a limited, although 
undeniable degree of normative power (within the EU legal order), rather not having 
any legal effect at all”.83 
     But also from a more doctrinally coherent perspective, to allow an a-la-cart 
observance of the international law, in accordance with the EU interests would grossly 
undermine the status of international law, as encompassing generally accepted, 
overarching rules and structures of universal character, and eventually trigger the 
collapse of the whole architecture called “hierarchy of legal norms”. Therefore, the 
approach followed by the Commission to issue a suspension injunction in order to 
impede the enforcement of ICSID intra-EU awards, shall be considered a violation of 
the EU fundamental objective enshrined in Article 3(5) TFEU to respect and promote 
international law and further, a breach of the Union’s international obligations.8485  
     At the other side of the spectrum, the investor’s possible “avenues” ,in cases where 
an EU Member State resists enforcement of an ICSID award on the basis of any EU 
Law constellations including suspension injunctions and ECJ infringement proceedings, 
although limited and of untested effectiveness, are still present. One possible scenario 
could be the adoption of some kind of punitive measures by the World Bank against 
Contracting States that avoid their treaty obligations. Furthermore, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) might provide a forum for a Contracting State to bring a case on 
behalf of an investor against another Contracting State for the latter’s refusal to enforce 
an ICSID award86.  
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F. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     The above analysis illustrates some of the most intinsing contours of this interface 
between intra-EU awards and EU State Aid Law and further exposes the real width, the 
intensity and the complexity of the perceived clash between international investment 
law and the EU Law.  
    As the mysteries and the peculiarities of EU State Aid regime penetrate in the field of 
international investment arbitration, the implications generated regarding compliance 
with intra-EU awards are particularly serious. As a general principle, where the 
obligation to compensate the “injured” investor derived from an arbitral decision and by 
operation of law, compliance with such an award does not amount to illegal State Aid 
under Article 107 TFEU as the imputability criterion is not met. However, as the 
exception that proves the rule, the payment of damages as compensation for the 
revocation of an illegal State Aid is deemed to constitute ipso facto a violation of the EU 
State Aid rules because it is conceived as an attempt to re-implement from the back 
door and de facto re-grant the revoked illegal aid and reallocate the lost economic 
benefit in an unauthorized, illegal and thus incompatible with the internal market 
manner.  
     These considerations have particular importance when such an intra-EU award 
enters the “universe” of EU Law at the enforcement stage under the NYC system. In 
this context, intra-EU awards enforceability shall be questioned on EU public policy 
grounds only at the presence of an EU Commission’s decision, declaring the illegality 
and incompatibility of the revoked measure. Within the ICSID “realm”, enforceability of 
awards rendered under its auspices, is, a principle, safeguarded. However, the 
Convention’s normative scope does not extend so far as to preclude non-Contracting 
parties, as the EU itself, not to impede or limit the enforcement of an intra-EU ICSID 
award where enforcement is conceived under the EU Law perspective, to constitute a 
violation of EU public policy. The EU Commission’s intentions, already demonstrated in 
the Micula case, to follow this “circumventing path” so as to block ICSID awards 
enforcement by neglecting international law obligations, directly clash with the core EU 
objective towards “strict observance” of international law. In this respect, EU Law 
seems to be suffering from an “identity crisis” with regards its position within and vis-à-
vis international law. In any event, it shall be emphasized, that prohibiting compliance 
with ICSID awards via the issuance of a suspension injunction constitutes a gross 
violation of the Union’s obligations vis-à-vis international law and injects uncertainty 
and unpredictability in a particularly sensitive area of economic activity, crying-out for 
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legal security and stability. Under these circumstances, it is mathematically certain, that 
the EU’s envisagement, to evolve itself in a considerable player in game of 
international investment will take a long time to find its realization. 
 
CHAPTER 7.  
 
THE FUTHRE OF THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (ECT) IN THE LICHT OF THE 
INTRA-EU BITS ANS EU LAW INTERPLAY 
 
        The envisagement of a European Energy Union, although eventually abandoned 
by the architects of the European structure, provided for the necessary momentum 
towards the establishment of a solid protective framework to surround cross-border 
investments in the energy sector, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). As a true 
grandchild of the EU, the ECT was elaborated by the Commission as a multilateral, 
sector-specific instrument that concentrate the impetus to play the role of an universal 
energy constitution of EU provenance. It has been either signed, ratified or acceded to 
by over 50 nations and international organizations among of which are all the EU 
Member States, the EU itself, and other very important international energy players. 
       As the interaction between investment treaty law with the EU Law climaxes, the 
tensions it generates extends also to the area of multilateral investment protection 
affecting particularly the ECT as the only multilateral investment protection instrument 
in which the European element is so inherently embedded. Further, as the 
problematique of applicability and validity of intra-EU BITs reaches its peak, particularly 
in the context of infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission against Member 
States requesting them to terminate their intra-EU BITs as incompatible with the EU 
Law, a question arises as to whether the realization of such a termination scenario 
would leave ECT unaffected and puts the ECT’s continuing applicability in the field of 
intra-EU investment under the microscope.  
        These tensions produced in the ECT area, derive from the simple reality that from 
an intra-EU perspective, since all EU Member States and the EU as an international 
organization are parties to the ECT, the Treaty could be conceived also as a mega-
intra-EU BIT comprised of several BITs concluded between each and every EU 
Member State with each other. As a preliminary remark it shall be stressed that the 
Commission’s almost obsessive stance against the continuing validity of intra-EU BITs 
within the EU legal order, leaves limited space to even speculate that the ECT while 
remain untouched by the Commission’s “fire”.  After all, this would be a manifest and 
unacceptable contradiction of policy from an EU perspective to intensively challenge 
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the necessity of maintaining an intra-EU system of investment protection based on 
BITs on the one hand, and on the other to immune from such an “epithesis” the ECT 
and its applicability in intra-EU investment disputes. It remains to be seen which modus 
operandi the Commission will choose to follow in order to bring ECT in line with its 
“intra-EU BITs –ground zero” position. This chapter will examine the ECT’s applicability 
on intra-EU investment disputes and the possible “venues” –if any available- that could 
lead to its disarmament with regards to this special category of investment disputes. 
 
A. THE ECT IN ITS INTRA-EU BIT DIMENSION 
 
   The problematique around ECT in the context of the Intra-EU BITs and EU Law battle 
basically arises due to the ECT’s operation between EU Member States as a mega-
intra-EU BIT or, in other words, a concrete bundle of intra-EU BITs uniformly applicable 
in the relations between EU Member States as parts of the ECT. From the 
Commission’s perspective, the major concern emerging here is that even if the 
scenario of intra-EU BITs termination finds its realization, intra-EU investment 
arbitration could still be an active alternative in case of disputes arising out of 
investments in the energy sector and are covered ratione materiae and ratione 
personae from the ECT. In this respect, the ECT is conceived not only as a factor 
resolving inconsistencies and filling gaps caused by the potential termination of the 
intra-EU BITs at least in the sensitive field of energy but also a parameter which if 
maintained as it stands, it would keep in life some of the intra-EU BITs most disturbing 
features.  As the Commission fears, ECT would provide for a backdoor ground for 
arbitral tribunals to assume jurisdiction over intra-EU energy disputes, misapply or 
disregard EU Law and hence it would de facto perpetuate the “anomaly within the 
internal market” that the Commission so passionately seeks to eliminate. 
    In the light of these considerations, it could be inferred with relative certainty that, the 
EU campaign towards the elimination of intra-EU BITS from the map of international 
investment protection will not leave ECT unaffected. The most complex part of the 
conundrum of ECT’s future relates to how exactly the EU institution will handle the 
peculiar dilemma of “having created the ECT and now having to ensure its compatibility 
with EU Law in relation to third countries and to deal with its continuing validity and 
applicability under international law also  for intra-EU relations”.  
     .Probably the EU will seek a formula to essentially dismantle ECT, so as to isolate 
and discard the intra-EU element and disconnect intra-EU relations from its scope of 
applicability. The fact that such an approach would directly run afoul and undermine the 
fundamental rationale underlying the ECT i.e. the establishment of a comprehensive, 
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well-rounded, solid framework for the promotion and the protection of energy 
investments, is another story, probably a very romantic and idealistic one to be taken 
seriously into account by the EU institutions so deeply engrossed in their project to 
extinguish intra-EU investment protection under BITs from the EU world.  
       In any case, provided for the ECT’s nature as a public international law instrument,  
any attempt to achieve such a carve-out solution as an amendment in the Treaty’s 
scope of application shall be surrounded with some kind of formality and be made in 
accordance with the applicable international rules in order to produce legal effects. A 
mere declaration even from the ECJ’s authoritative lips on the incompatibility of the 
Treaty’s intra-EU dimension with the EU Law would not be binding on arbitral tribunals 
established under the ECT auspices and a fortiori it would by no means suffice to 
trigger the public policy exception in order to block the enforcement of an intra-EU 
award made under the ECT. Of course, awards rendered under the ICSID aegis 
continue to be shield from any public policy related scrutiny. However, such a carve-out 
in the ECT’s scope of applicability made in the form of a binding, from a treaty law point 
of view, amendment would eventually prevent also ICSID tribunals to blithely ignore it.  
Dimopoulos suggests that the resolution of the conundrum regarding the applicability of 
ECT could be derived from an assumption of EU Law prevalence vis-à-vis ECT as lex 
specialis, applicable in spite of issues of temporality, given that the determination of the 
temporal order of ECT and EU Law, as legal instruments both operating in the 
investment protection area is particularly complex to allow eventually the application of 
the lex posterior interpretative rule to resolve any conflict. However, provided for the 
ECT’s sector-specific nature, and the absence of Member States explicit or even 
implicit declaration of their genuine intention to prioritize EU Law over the specialized 
and comprehensive ECT framework and allow its inapplicability in their inter se 
relations, it is doubtful whether this approach has the necessary doctrinal foundations 
but also the conceptual “impetus” to effectively resolve the issue of ECT applicability87.        
 
B. DOES THE ECT STILL HAVE BINDING EFFECT WITH REGARDS THE EU 
MEMBER STATES inter se RELATIONS? 
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               Any prophesy regarding the ECT’s future shall take into consideration the 
Treaty’s nature as a Mixed Agreement. This characterization refers not only to the fact 
that both the EU and its Member States are contracting parties of the ECT but it also to 
the mixed allocation of competences in the fields covered by the Treaty. Under this 
unique competence constellation, the EU enjoys exclusive competence in energy trade 
aspects of the ECT. Competence on issues relating to investment promotion and 
protection was firstly allocated to the Member States. In the advent of Lisbon Treaty the 
balance of competences slightly changed as foreign direct investment was located 
under the umbrella of EU’s exclusive competence. Hence, extra-EU investment 
covered by the ECT shall be considered as encompassed by the Union’s exclusive 
competence in the FDI area. However, ECT remains a Mixed Agreement insofar the 
Lisbon competence shift did not affect the intra-EU investment which remains an area 
of shared competences and from an ECT perspective continues to fall under the 
Member States powers.  
     The legal character of the ECT as a mixed agreement under EU Law does not 
undermine or distort its comprehensive legally binding effect from the perspective of 
international law erga omnes, i.e. not only between EU and its Member States vis-a-vis 
third States but also with regards to the inter se relationships of the EU Member 
States.88.  
     With regards to the Member States inter se relations, any attempt to disconnect 
them from the ECT’s scope of application shall be made in the light of the assumption 
that when acting within the spectrum of a mixed agreement, Member States are 
proceeding as autonomous subjects of international law and they are entering in 
international law relations creating rights and obligations also in an inter se level89. Any 
adjustment or modification to the status quo existing between them -in this context, the 
elimination of the intra-EU dimension of the ECT- shall be made in the form of a public 
international law treaty regulating exactly the desired alteration in the regime governing 
their inter se relations. However, it is rather questionable whether the ECT framework 
leaves any space for the conclusion of such inter se carve-out agreements between EU 
Member States as an attempt to disconnect intra-EU investment from its ambit.  
     One “venue” that could eventually allow a modification in the ECT’s legally binding 
effect in a Member States inter se level, in a “disconnection clause”. Under interesting 
international law constellation endorsed also in Article 30(2) VCLT, Member States 
could deviate from ECT’s scope, escape in a partial or in an absolute manner the 
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regulation of their relations by the Treaty and instead, apply EU law in their inter se 
involvements to the extent it covers the particular subject matter.  
     However, the ECT framework does not endorse an “exit” from its regulatory scope 
under a “disconnection clause”. This clearly intended omission per se reflects the 
overarching desideratum underpinning the establishment of the ECT i.e. its 
comprehensively binding effect. The fact that the ECT constitutes an EU architecture 
emphasizes the imperative of preserving the ECT’s intra-EU dimension in order to 
ensure its integrity as a legal instrument. Furtherly, Article 16 ECT essentially prohibits 
the conclusion of such inter se agreements that eventually, affect adversely the 
position of the investor as established under the ECT by entailing a de facto and de 
jure deprivation of substantive and procedural rights enjoyed under the ECT.  
      The most illustrative example of a core procedural right, the provision of which by 
the ECT locates the investor or the investment in a significantly more favorable position 
that the EU Law could ever bring him, is the opportunity to submit an investment 
dispute to international arbitration under Article 26 ECT. As a matter of fact, by virtue of 
the ECT’s character as the “holy bible” of energy investment disputes, particularly 
where an EU element is involved, a considerable number of intra-EU arbitrations have 
been taken place under the Treaty’s aegis including Plama v Bulgaria, AES v Hungary, 
Electrabel S.A. v Hungary, and the prominent cases of Vatenfall v Gemany.  
     The only provision within the ECT that could be conceived as providing for a partial 
disconnection clause is Article 26(3)(b)(ii)90. The Communities, in the form of a written 
Statement have taken advantage of this “escape clause” in order to exclude EU 
nationals from submitting disputes against other Member States in international 
arbitration. Could this Statement be considered binding also for the EU Member States 
and thus entail an implicit modification of the Member States inter se relations 
regarding the ECT binding effect? It is seriously questionable whether this question 
could be answered in the affirmative since it is generally accepted that within the 
framework of a mixed agreement, the Member States operate independently from the 
EU, as autonomous subjects of international law.  
         The only basis upon which the argument of implied modification could be 
examined is Article 41 VCLT stipulating that in principio, any modifications attempted in 
the regulatory “corpus” of a public international law treaty shall be governed by the 
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provisions of the treaty concerned. Hence, modification is, as a matter of principle, 
recognized and allowed as a scenario, however not unconditionally, but only to the 
extent it does not “affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the 
(modified-to-be) treaty or the performance of their obligations or relate to a provision 
derogation which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose 
of the treaty as a whole as stipulated by Article 41(1)VCLT”.91. 
     Seen through this prism of interpretation, Article 41 VCLT calls into action the only 
relevant ECT provision, Article 16 ECT and its corresponding prerequisites for such an 
inter se modification precluding the ECTs replacement when ipso facto, negative 
implication could be imposed to the investor. This provision incorporates a vulnerability 
safeguard to ensure a minimum standard of substantive and procedural protection 
offered to an investor under the ECT that is immune from any inter se modification that 
may occur. In this sense, permitting an inter se modification that would severely affect 
this minimum of protection to the investor’s detriment, would grossly injure the ECT’s 
objective and purposive foundations and represent a de facto “mutilation” of the 
material and procedural rights and guarantees to the investor’s disposal. The intensity 
and irreversibility of this deprivation of rights can be appreciated in its wholeness in the 
context of investment arbitration provided to the investor under Article 26 ECT, which 
as an alternative is completely absent within the EU investment protection framework 
as incompatible with the principle of mutual trust and the ECJ’s interpretative 
monopoly. To deny resort to such as specialized judicial forum as the investor-State 
arbitration is and to subject the investor to the jurisdiction of EU national courts, 
constitutes a serious deterioration of his position. As aptly submitted by the arbitral 
tribunal in the Plama v Bulgaria case:  
  “for all these reasons, Article 26 ECT provides to a covered investor an almost 
unprecedented remedy for its claim against a host state. The ECT has been described, 
together with NAFTA, as "the major multilateral treaty pioneering the extensive use of  
legal methods characteristic of the fledging regulation of the global economy", of  which 
"perhaps the most important aspect of the ECT’s investment regime is the  provision for 
compulsory arbitration against governments at the option of foreign  investors ..."; and 
these same distinguished commentators concluded: "With a  paradigm shift away from 
mere protection by the home state of investors and traders  to the legal architecture of 
a liberal global economy, goes a coordinated use of trade  and investment law methods 
to achieve the same objective: a global level playing field  for activities in competitive 
markets". By any standards, Article 26 is a very  important feature of the ECT which is 
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itself a very significant treaty for investors,  marking another step in their transition from 
objects to subjects of international law.”  
 
 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
     The conceptual weight of the above-mentioned words of the Plama tribunal, 
authoritatively and so comprehensively encapsulating the ECT’s paramountcy in the 
hall of international investment norms, reveal the legal necessity to preserve the 
individual rights dimension of the ECT unaffected by any inter se modifications that 
would deteriorate the investor’s position. To the extent such a modification would allow 
ECT protective framework to be substituted by the corresponding –and of questionable 
efficacy- EU Law investment protection provisions, and more importantly would entail 
the direct and irreconcilable deprivation of the investor’s ECT fundamental procedural 
right to resort to investor- State arbitration, it constitutes an direct attack to the ECT’s 
beating heart as a Treaty with an individual rights dimension, and as such it shall not 
be permitted.     
    In conclusion, the applicability of ECT in intra-EU investor-State disputes is by no 
means undermined or otherwise affected by the EU Law. EU nationals are able to bring 
claims under the ECT against other Member States  
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CHAPTER 8.  
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
           The above analysis has shed significant light to the interplay between intra-EU 
BIT and EU Law, as well as to the fascinating implication of this interface. The 
problematique surrounding their “co-habitation” as legal norms, seems nowadays, 
more heated than ver. Certainly, the scenario set forth the EU Commission pressing 
the Member States to rescind their mutual obligations by terminating their intra-EU 
BITs, does not provide for a sophisticated legal solution to the “dilemma” of preserving 
or extinguishing them from the map inter-EU investment law norms. Rather, it 
disregards the tantamount importance of intra-EU BITs in safeguarding 
comprehensively and effectively the investor’s rights and the deep “deficit” of 
investment protection that will be certainly caused with the EU by their potential 
disappearance.  
  In searching for the “perfect equilibrium” between those competing legal norms , there 
are some possible solutions that potentially could provide for an effective solution to 
this legal “conundrum” surrounding their “co-habitation” in the intra-EU investment 
landscape. The introduction of an MFN obligation to the Member States, in the form of 
a solid principle within the EU legal order, and most importantly, the insert of MFN 
clauses to existing intra-EU BITs, would certainly facilitate the accommodation of intra-
EU BIT’s within the EU legal order. These clauses would ensure the extension of all 
substantive and procedural standards contained in an intra-EU BIT automatically also 
to investors from other Member States, by reference to the highest standards available. 
Under this solution, the argument of the discriminatory effect of intra-EU BITs, will have 
no reason to further develop. 
     Another “path” that could be followed in order to adapt intra-EU BITs within the EU 
Legal order without jeopardizing the advantages stemming from their operation, would 
be the adoption of European clauses within the problematic intra-EU BITs. Under this 
solution, these elements that in the eyes of the EU institution constitute 
incompatibilities with the EU would be more harmoniously incorporated within the EU 
legal order. Special reference, under this solution, may be made to European public 
policy considerations which constitute a source of legal uncertainty, particularly in the 
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context of intra-EU arbitral awards enforceability. In this sense, these clauses, may well 
serve as authoritative guides for the right, uniform and effective application of EU Law, 
and possibly, ensure jurisprudential consistency with the EU Legal order.   
    With these considerations in mind, and having in mind the pending infringement 
proceedings on the termination of some intra-EU BITs, it is obvious, that an attempt to 
reconcile these presumably clashing legal regimes, requires something more than 
aspirational suggestions. It requires the resolution of this conflict to be elevated into the 
“ultimate desideratum” of both Member States and the EU institutions.  It remains to be 
seen, whether intra-EU BITs will continue their “lives” within the EU legal order, which, 
almost obsessively pursues their “extinction”. 
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